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I Introduction 
 
Brain injury is a debilitating mental impairment.  It can cause aggression, impulsivity, 
and other socially challenging behaviours, including criminal offending.1  This is largely 
a consequence of damage to the frontal lobes, the part of the brain that facilitates self-
regulation and emotional control.  Remedying this requires specialist rehabilitation, 
preferably in dedicated facilities.2  However, rather than being in such facilities, a 
disproportionate number of brain injured New Zealanders are in prison, often for violent 
or sexual offences.3  By contrast, other mentally impaired offenders, such as the 
intellectually disabled and mentally ill, are not kept in prison but instead transferred to the 
health jurisdiction to receive treatment or care.  This raises a question as to why brain 
injured offenders do not receive the same therapeutic response by our criminal justice 
system. 
 
This paper explores that question by examining the current legislative framework for 
diverting mentally impaired offenders into healthcare through therapeutic dispositions on 
sentencing.  It demonstrates the inadequacy of this framework for violent or sexual 
offenders with brain injury by showing how the gateway definitions of “intellectual 
disability” and “mental disorder” exclude that condition.  It then explores the 
appropriateness of imprisoning serious offenders with brain injury by examining whether 
their detention breaches the state’s statutory obligations, and argues that the status quo 
violates both the Corrections Act 2004 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
Finally, in recognition of the current exclusion of brain injured offenders from therapeutic 
dispositions, and the potential illegality of their detention in prison, this paper argues for 
an expansion of the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction and examines mechanisms to achieve 
this. 
  
1  Judith Aharon-Peretz and Rachel Tomer “Traumatic Brain Injury” in Bruce Miller and Jeffrey 
Cummings (eds) The Human Frontal Lobes: Functions and Disorders (2nd ed, The Guilford Press, 
New York, 2007) at 541 and 544; Max Cavit and Allison Foster “Traumatic Brain Injuries among 
Corrections Populations: Implications and Intervention Strategies” (2010) Rethinking Crime and 
Punishment <www.rethinking.org.nz>. 
2  Interview with Allison Foster PhD, Research Director, ABI Rehabilitation (the author, 27 June 
2013); Interview with Wol Hansen, Counsellor and Psychologist (registration pending) (the author, 
26 June 2013). 
3  National Health Committee Health in Justice: Kia Piki te Ora, Kia Tika! Improving the Health of 
Prisoners and their Families and Whanau (Ministry of Health, 2010) at 3 and 92; Tracey Barnfield 
and Janet Leathem “Incidence and outcomes of traumatic brain injury and substance abuse in a New 
Zealand prison population” (1998) 12 Brain Injury 455. 
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II Scope and Design 
A Methodology 
 
The information used for this analysis was obtained from two main sources.  Primary 
research was undertaken with three health practitioners with relevant qualifications or 
experience working with brain injured offenders.  Ethics approval was obtained for this 
research.  The practitioners were interviewed with a set of standardised questions about 
brain injury, its link to criminal offending, and the appropriateness of treatment in various 
facilities.4  The practitioners were each provided a copy, and approved, the interview 
notes taken.  The information obtained was then used to inform the author’s analysis of 
the appropriateness of the current regime and is cited where appropriate.  Secondary 
research was also undertaken.  A brief literature review of scientific material on brain 
injury and its connection to criminal offending was carried out.  Second, a review of 
statute and case law on the current therapeutic jurisdiction was undertaken, including 
supporting academic commentary.  This material was used to describe the current regime 
and is also cited where appropriate and listed in the bibliography. 
B Limitations 
 
This paper is limited in scope in three ways.  First, it only focuses on brain injured 
offenders who commit serious imprisonable offences, such as sexual or violent crimes, 
for whom community sentences are not possible.  It is acknowledged that a problem also 
exists in respect of brain injured offenders who commit non-imprisonable offences, for 
whom no diversionary mechanism exists at all.  It is also acknowledged that the legal 
position may vary for brain injured offenders who commit offences that do not require 
imprisonment, as different sentencing options are available to the courts in that situation.  
However, this paper will not examine those two categories. 
 
Second, this paper only discusses the legal framework for post-conviction dispositions.  It 
excludes consideration of pre-conviction mechanisms, such as fitness to plead and 
insanity.  It also excludes analysis of a much broader and related legal policy issue as to 
how the criminal justice system (including the police, lawyers, and courts) identify and 
respond to brain injured (and other cognitively impaired) persons at the point of first 
  
4  The set of questions used for these interviews is annexed as Appendix One. 
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engagement and the type of supports and protections they receive during police 
questioning, criminal investigation, and trial. 
 
Finally, the paper also excludes consideration of mental impairment as a mitigating factor 
in sentencing.  For completeness, it is noted that a court can reduce the length or severity 
of an offender’s sentence through recognising a mental impairment as causing 
“diminished intellectual capacity”,5 or the conditions of prison as being unduly severe 
because of the impairment.6  However, despite the mitigation power being obviously 
related to the topic, this paper lacks the scope to consider how it is used to ameliorate 
punitive sentences for the mentally impaired and limits itself to therapeutic dispositions 
only. 
C Outline 
 
By way of overview, this paper is constructed as follows.  First, in Part III, a brief survey 
of the literature on brain injury and its connection to increased criminal behaviour is 
provided.  Part IV then introduces the rationales behind the current mental impairment 
framework and the theories as to why mentally impaired offenders are not appropriate 
subjects for orthodox criminal punishment.  In Part V the legislative mechanisms for 
diversion of mentally impaired offenders into healthcare are explained.  Part VI 
demonstrates how the threshold definitions for such diversion exclude brain injury.  Part 
VII then explores how imprisoning brain injured offenders may violate prisoners’ rights 
to demonstrate why the continued exclusion of such offenders from the court’s 
therapeutic jurisdiction is untenable.  Finally, Part VIII discusses options for reform. 
 
III Acquired Brain Injury and Criminal Offending 
A Preliminary definitions 
 
The literature on brain injury employs a number of closely related and overlapping terms, 
differentiated here for clarity.  First, “acquired brain injury” (ABI) is used to describe any 
brain injury experienced after birth.7  Such an injury may result from hypoxia, infection, 
stroke, or physical trauma.  As such, ABI encompasses the related term “traumatic brain 
injury” (TBI) which refers to a brain injury resulting from an external application of force 
  
5  Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(2)(e). 
6  Ibid, s 8(h). 
7  ABI Rehabilitation “Brain Injury Information” < www.abi-rehab.co.nz>. 
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to the head as occurs in a car accident, fall, or assault.8  An associated term is “head 
injury”.  This describes the originating injury leading to a TBI.9  However, head injury 
does not necessarily result in brain injury, and brain injury can occur without head injury, 
so the two terms are not synonymous (although sometimes used as such).10  In this paper, 
the umbrella term ABI is used unless a more specific term is used in a source document.  
However, it is noted that most brain injured offenders have traumatic, rather than non-
traumatic, injuries, largely from car accidents or assault.11 
B Executive dysfunction:  the consequences of ABI 
 
A nexus between ABI and adverse social behaviour is well recognised.12  While every 
person with ABI has a unique set of symptoms, common post-injury experiences include 
increased fatigue and irritability,13 cognitive deficits (difficulties in information-
processing, memory, and attention) and difficulties with behavioural control (including 
impulsivity, aggression, and obsessive compulsive behaviour).14  These issues result from 
physical damage to the frontal cortex, the part of the brain that facilitates self-regulation 
(the ability to stop oneself before saying or doing something inappropriate), higher 
reasoning (the ability to use memory to foresee consequences), and socio-adaptive 
capacities such as empathy (the ability to identify and understand the feelings of other 
people).15 
 
This pattern of behaviour following ABI is termed “executive dysfunction”.16  The 
behavioural effects of executive dysfunction can be severe: studies have demonstrated 
  
8  Cavit and Foster, above n 1. 
9  New Zealand Guidelines Group Traumatic Brain Injury: Diagnosis, Acute Management and 
Rehabilitation: Summary (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2007) at 1. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Barnfield and Leathem, above n 3, at 461. 
12  Aharon-Peretz and Tomer, above n 1, at 541 and 544. 
13  Cavit and Foster, above n 1. 
14  Aharon-Peretz and Tomer, above n 1, at 541 and 544; Cavit and Foster, above n 1; Elisa Lavelle and 
Suzanne Barker-Collo “Neuropsychology and the Assessment of Competence” in Fred Seymour, 
Suzanne Blackwell and John Thorburn (eds) Psychology and the Law in Aotearoa New Zealand 
(New Zealand Psychological Society, Wellington, 2011) at 220. 
15  W Williams and others “Traumatic Brain Injury in a Prison Population: Prevalence and Risk for Re-
Offending” (2010) 24 Brain Injury 1184; Lavelle and Barker-Collo, above n 14, at 220-221; 
Interview with Foster, above n 2. 
16  Lavelle and Barker-Collo, above n 14, at 221.  It is also sometimes referred to as “frontal lobe 
disorder” but this paper will use the term “executive dysfunction”. 
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damage to the frontal cortex causing a marked increase in a person’s propensity to 
physical or verbal violence;17 long-term issues with poor judgement and decision-
making;18 and an increased likelihood of comorbid mental illness or psychosis.19  
Executive dysfunction can also be very long-lasting: in one study of brain injured 
persons, more than 50% of participants demonstrated personality changes and emotional 
difficulties up to 15 years after the original head injury.20  As such, it is now widely 
accepted that ABI causes considerable adverse effects on cognitive functioning and 
behaviour.  As such, ABI-related executive dysfunction can be categorised as a mental 
impairment of equivalent severity to intellectual disability or mental illness. 
C ABI, executive dysfunction, and criminality 
 
ABI is also connected to criminal offending.  Two quantitative studies undertaken in New 
Zealand demonstrate this relationship.  First, a 1998 study found 78.8% of a Whanganui 
prison population had experienced a TBI of some seriousness, with 10.8% demonstrating 
severe TBI.21  Supporting this, a 2005 New Zealand Prisoner Health Survey identified 
64% of prisoners had experienced a head injury during their lifetime (although, as noted, 
this does not necessarily mean all 64% would have had an ABI).22  By contrast, the rate 
of ABI in the general population is considerably lower.  As compared with the 78% of 
Whanganui prison inmates who had experienced TBI during their lifetime, only about 2% 
of the general population in New Zealand have experienced TBI.23  Such a considerable 
disjunct in the prevalence rates of ABI between offending and non-offending populations 
indicates a relationship between ABI and criminal offending in New Zealand. 
 
The domestic research findings are consistent with research undertaken in comparable 
jurisdictions.  In the United Kingdom, research showed 60.7% of a local prison 
population had a history of head injury, with 16% of that population demonstrating 
  
17  Jose Leon-Carrion and Francisco Javier Chacartegui Ramos “Blows to the head during development 
can predispose to violent criminal behaviour: rehabilitation of consequences of head injury is a 
measure for crime prevention” (2003) 17 Brain Injury 207 at 208. 
18  Aharon-Peretz and Tomer, above n 1, at 545. 
19  New Zealand Guidelines Group Traumatic Brain Injury: Diagnosis, Acute Management and 
Rehabilitation (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2006) at 173 and 174. 
20  Aharon-Peretz and Tomer, above n 1, at 544. 
21  Barnfield and Leathem, above n 3, at 459. 
22  National Health Committee, above n 3, at 3 and 92. 
23  Cavit and Foster, above n 1.  It is acknowledged that many people experiencing mild TBI may not 
seek medical attention and as such, the rate of ABI in both populations may be higher. 
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moderate to severe TBI.24  Similarly, in Australia, corrections’ data identified 42% of 
male inmates and 33% of female had cognitive impairment, including ABI.25  As such, 
there seems to be an internationally established correlation between ABI and offending, 
broadly equivalent to that found in New Zealand.  The exact nature of the relationship 
between ABI and offending is less certain, as discussed below. 
1 The etiology of serious criminality in people with ABI 
 
Despite the obvious statistical correlation, the etiology of criminality in the ABI 
population is not entirely clear.  Not all people with ABI commit criminal offences and, 
as such, there is no absolute or determinative relationship between the two.26  Rather, 
practitioners characterise the relationship as correlative, with the effects of ABI seen to 
“trigger” certain behaviours that may then lead to criminal offending.27 
 
This view of ABI as correlated to, not causative of, offending is supported by 
international literature.28  The theory can be summarised as follows.  Executive 
dysfunction means a person with ABI experiences difficulty in mediating and controlling 
their behaviour.29  When faced with a confrontational or stressful situation (such as a 
domestic dispute) a person with ABI is much more likely to respond with physical 
aggression or violence than a person without ABI, whose brain has a greater capacity to 
utilise non-violent socio-adaptive skills such as negotiation or dialogue to respond to the 
situation.30 
 
This cognitive or functional deficit is compounded by increased levels of fatigue, 
irritability, or frustration experienced as a consequence of ABI, independently working to 
lower a person’s “flash point” for aggression.31  Consequently, people with ABI have a 
heightened propensity to commit acts of violence, and therefore to commit criminal acts, 
  
24  W Williams and others, above n 15, at 1186. 
25  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee Inquiry into Access to and Interaction with the 
Justice System by People with an Intellectual Disability and their Families and Carers – Final 
Report (Parliamentary Paper 216, 2013) at xxii. 
26  Interview with Foster, above n 2; Interview with Hansen, above n 2. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Drew Barzman and Manish Fozdar “Does traumatic brain injury cause violence?” (2002) 1 Journal 
of Family Practice; Leon-Carrion and Ramos, above n 17; W Williams and others, above n 15. 
29  Leon-Carrion and Ramos, above n 17, at 213. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Interview with Foster, above n 2; Interview with Hansen, above n 2. 
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than people without ABI.  This relationship is particularly pronounced when the person 
has other biological or social risk factors predisposing them to offending such as social 
environment, substance abuse, employment status, ethnicity, or gender.32 
 
People with ABI also have a heightened propensity to commit sexual offences.  People 
with ABI experience disinhibition, causing them to act impulsively and without 
processing risk and consequence (including the effects of their behaviour on others).33  
Disinhibition can lead to hypersexuality and sexually inappropriate behaviour,34  
manifesting as inappropriate touching, sexual aggression, or even rape.35  Such behaviour 
is obviously criminal.  Thus, ABI-related executive dysfunction can predispose persons to 
serious violent or sexual criminal behaviour through reducing their capacity to utilise 
‘rational’ responses to confrontation, stress, or sexual impulses. 
2 ABI and less serious forms of criminality 
 
While outside the scope of this paper, it should be noted that non-violent forms of 
criminality are also linked to ABI.  People with ABI can be predisposed to commit low 
level judgement-related offences such as speeding, driving without a licence, or 
stealing.36  Propensity for such offending is also seen to result from ABI-related cognitive 
deficits and, in particular, the reduced capacity to foresee consequence and process risk 
(poor decision-making).37  When combined with impulsivity or a social environment that 
facilitates criminality, the likelihood of this non-violent offending is most pronounced.  A 
robust legal framework for managing brain injured offenders must also provide for such 
lower level offending, but consideration of this falls outside this paper. 
D Rehabilitation of ABI 
 
The adverse cognitive and behavioural effects of ABI are not necessarily permanent.  
Internationally, ABI rehabilitation is statistically correlated to lower levels of aggression 
  
32  Leon-Carrion and Ramos, above n 17, at 209. 
33  Aharon-Peretz and Tomer, above n 1, at 545. 
34  New Zealand Guidelines Group, above n 19, at 114. 
35  Ibid. 
36  See, for example, Ministry of Health v M FC Manukau FAM-2006-092-2802, 21 December 2006 
where the brain injured person attempted to interfere with motor vehicles and Re DG [2003] NZFLR 
87 (MHRT) where the brain injured person consistently drove without a licence. 
37  See Lavelle and Barker-Collo, above n 14, at 220. 
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and violence,38 and to reduced recidivism.39  As such, there is significant rehabilitation 
potential for ABI offenders.  This is greatest where provided by ABI specialists in 
dedicated facilities.40  ABI is complex and has many “silent” symptoms (such as 
impulsivity) that risk going undetected where treatment is provided by general mental 
health practitioners.41  Of particular salience is that these symptoms are also the most 
linked to criminal offending.42  Accordingly, for treatment to be effective, specialist 
intervention is essential. 
 
IV The Criminal Justice System and Mentally Impaired Offenders 
 
The scientific literature discussed above shows ABI is a form of mental impairment.  
New Zealand’s criminal justice system responds to most mentally impaired offenders by 
diverting them into the health jurisdiction to ensure their treatment, rehabilitation or care.  
This section of the paper outlines the theory behind, and options for, such therapeutic 
diversion. 
A An overview of the diversionary jurisdiction 
 
It is a well settled principle that mentally impaired persons should be treated differently 
to others in the criminal justice process.43  This stems from recognition that such persons 
have reduced mental capacity and rationality and are therefore less culpable for 
offending, less able to understand any punishment imposed, and may not be competent to 
participate in a traditional criminal trial.44  As such, diversion from the criminal justice 
system is accepted as appropriate.45 
  
38  Leon-Carrion and Ramos, above n 17, at 214. 
39  Cavit and Foster, above n 1. 
40  Interview with Foster, above n 2. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010) at 403. 
44  Warren Brookbanks “The Sentencing and Disposition of Mentally Disordered Offenders” in Warren 
Brookbanks and Sandy Simpson (eds) Psychiatry and the Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 197 
at 199 and 206. 
45  The sentencing of mentally impaired offenders is a complex area and it is acknowledged that at 
times an offender’s mental impairment may actually result in an increase in a sentence’s 
punitiveness, including preventive detention: R v McGee (1995) 13 CRNZ 108 (CA).  However, as 
this paper’s primary focus is on the availability and use of therapeutic dispositions, it lacks scope to 
engage in a complete discussion of sentencing law in this area. 
12 Acquired Brain Injury and Serious Criminal Offenders: An Argument to Expand the Court’s Therapeutic Jurisdiction 
 
Diversion can take several forms at different points in the criminal justice process, as 
illustrated in a flowchart annexed as Appendix Two.46  First, the person can be diverted 
from trial through being found unfit to plead,47 or diverted from conviction through the 
defence of insanity.48  Both of these pre-conviction mechanisms can be used for any 
mentally impaired person, including those whose impairment is ABI-related.49  However, 
fitness to plead and insanity both have high threshold conditions that are difficult to 
satisfy, and the perceived onerousness of the resulting disposition means these 
mechanisms are not widely used.50  Alternatively, and more commonly, mentally 
impaired people are tried and convicted for their offending, but diverted from prison 
through therapeutic dispositions on sentencing.51  These dispositions are the focus of this 
paper.  The rationales for diverting the mentally impaired into healthcare are discussed 
below. 
B The theoretical basis for therapeutic diversion from prison 
 
While imprisonment is usually an appropriate sentence for people who have committed 
serious or violent offences, it is not so for mentally impaired offenders.  This is because 
two of its primary rationales, retribution and deterrence, are rendered futile by the 
person’s impairment,52 and the impairment makes rehabilitation a key sentencing goal. 
1 Retribution 
 
Retribution is a fundamental sentencing principle.  It reflects the idea that the offender 
who has done something wrong or harmful deserves punishment.53  Punishment also 
communicates social and institutional disapproval of the behaviour and forces the 
offender to consider this, in the expectation it will promote remorse, accountability, and 
  
46  The flowchart is the work of the author’s and any error is accordingly hers. 
47  Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, ss 7-19. 
48  Ibid, ss 20-22. 
49  See, for example, Re C MHRT08/057, 26 May 2008 which involved a person with ABI who was 
acquitted of sexual violation on account of insanity and Waitemata District Health Board v B (2005) 
25 FRNZ 709 (DC) which involved a person with ABI who was found unfit to plead to a charge of 
sexual violation. 
50  Ashworth, above n 43, at 403. 
51  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 199. 
52  Ibid, at 206. 
53  Sir Bruce Robertson Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at 
[SA7.01]. 
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ultimately lead to changed behaviour.54  However, a mentally impaired person may 
experience unique difficulty controlling antisocial behaviour, meaning punishment is less 
deserved.55  Equally, the mental impairment may mean the offender lacks the necessary 
cognitive capacity to understand the communicative element of punishment or respond to 
it.56  As such, the rationale of retribution is not well served by imprisoning mentally 
impaired offenders. 
 
This is apposite to ABI offenders.  Executive dysfunction renders ABI offenders less able 
to control impulses and so less blameworthy than non-impaired offenders for their 
behaviour.  As such, they are less “deserving” of punishment than a fully rational 
criminal offender.  Equally, an ABI offender, as a consequence of diminished cognitive 
capacity, is less able to understand and process the social communication of punishment 
and less able to autonomously reform their offending behaviour in response to it. 
2 Deterrence 
 
Deterrence is another fundamental rationale of imprisonment.  Like retribution, it is also 
compromised when imprisoning the mentally impaired.  Deterrence reflects the idea that 
when an offender is punished, such punishment (through its unpleasantness) will 
discourage further offending.57  This relies on an offender rationally processing risk and 
consequence before the offending behaviour is performed.  Where a person is mentally 
impaired, such a rational response to the risk of punishment is unavailable.58  Diminished 
cognitive capacity, such as occurs with ABI, inhibits the processing of risk and 
consequence when making decisions.  In addition, impulsivity or deficits in the ability to 
control one’s behaviour when stressed, excited, or confronted, means a rational 
assessment of the prospect of punishment, even if cognitively possible, is unlikely to 
affect behaviour. 
3 Incapacitation 
 
As a consequence of the futility of deterrence and retribution, imprisonment of the 
mentally impaired becomes largely or solely based on the rationale of incapacitation, 
  
54  Ashworth, above n 43, at 90. 
55  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 206. 
56  Ashworth, above n 43, at 403. 
57  Robertson, above n 53, at [SA7.05]. 
58  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 206. 
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detention to protect the public.59  In some situations this may be justified as mentally 
impaired offenders can pose a significant risk of danger to others, particularly when their 
impairment results in an inability to control violent behaviour.60  However, without such 
detention also involving the provision of treatment or rehabilitation, it risks being 
inhumane and violating human rights.61  As such, of itself, incapacitation is not an 
appropriate rationale for imprisoning mentally impaired offenders and could be 
challenged as a breach of the state’s obligations. 
4 Rehabilitation 
 
Because the main rationales of imprisonment are not met by imprisoning mentally 
impaired offenders, and their impairment raises health and welfare needs, diversion is 
appropriate.  Thus, the appropriate sentencing principle in such cases is rehabilitation.62  
When sentencing for rehabilitative purposes, the court focuses on the welfare needs of the 
offender, rather than the gravity of their offence, and imposes a sentence that ensures 
such needs are met through an order requiring care or treatment.63 
 
Rehabilitative sentences are not uncontroversial.  As the conditions for release become 
connected with the “cure” of the offender’s problem, there is a risk that a rehabilitative 
disposition may become disproportionate to the index offence.64  Consequently, impaired 
offenders risk being detained for treatment for a significantly longer period than would 
have been the case if detained for retribution.65  This compromises proportionality, a 
principle requiring the onerousness of a punishment to match the seriousness of the crime 
committed.66 
 
However, where a mentally impaired offender would benefit from treatment or care, 
imprisonment would not serve any purpose other than incapacitation, and security 
  
59  Robertson, above n 53, at [SA7.06]. 
60  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 199 and 212-213. 
61  National Health Committee, above n 3, at [7.4.1]; Brookbanks, above n 44, at 214. 
62  Ashworth, above n 43, at 404.  This is not universally accepted.  In some cases the court may 
identify the offender’s impairment as creating a considerable risk of harm through the potential for 
recidivism.  In this situation the court may use the mental impairment to justify the imposition of an 
extremely punitive sentence of preventive detention, rather than a therapeutic order: Brookbanks, 
above n 44, at 209. 
63  Ashworth, above n 43, at 86. 
64  Ibid, at 87. 
65  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 203. 
66  Ibid, at 204. 
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concerns can be addressed, a sentencing court should treat the offender’s health needs as 
its primary concern.  As authoritatively determined by the influential Mason Report,67 
mentally impaired offenders should be the primary responsibility of the health system, 
not the corrections system.68  Not only is this more consistent with the state’s obligations 
(examined in Part VII) but it is a better risk reduction strategy.  Where mental impairment 
is connected to offending behaviour (whether directly or indirectly), addressing that 
impairment is more likely to reduce recidivism than punishment alone. 
 
V Pathways to Treatment:  Therapeutic Dispositions 
 
The preceding section of the paper identified why imprisoning mentally impaired 
offenders is inappropriate and diversion into therapeutic services preferred.  This part 
discusses the legislative framework that facilitates therapeutic diversion, contained in the 
Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (“CP(MIP)Act”), the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (“MH(CAT)Act”) and the 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 (“ID(CCR)Act”). 
A Therapeutic Dispositions: s 34 CP(MIP)Act 
 
Where a mentally impaired person has committed a serious or violent offence but their 
mental state is such that treatment, rather than incarceration, is justified, s 34 of the 
CP(MIP)Act allows the court to divert the offender into treatment, care, or rehabilitation.  
This transfers the offender from the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections to that 
of the Ministry of Health. 
 
The s 34 power is available where three threshold conditions are satisfied.  First, the 
offender must have been convicted of an imprisonable offence.69  Therapeutic 
dispositions are not available for minor offending.  Second, one or more health assessors 
must provide evidence that the offender’s mental impairment requires compulsory 
treatment or care for the offender’s own interests, the safety of the public, or the safety of 
  
67  The “Mason Report” was a report released in 1988 following a commission of inquiry led by Judge 
Ken Mason into psychiatric services in New Zealand.  It was the impetus for the development of 
forensic mental health services, services that cater for mentally ill criminal offenders:  Ministry of 
Health Census of Forensic Mental Health Services 2005 (Wellington, 2007) at 1. 
68  David Chaplow “Services for Mentally Abnormal Offenders: Some Important Issues” in Warren 
Brookbanks and Sandy Simpson (eds) Psychiatry and the Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) 383 
at 387. 
69  Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 34(1). 
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a person or class of person.70  Third, one or more health assessors must provide evidence 
that the offender is “mentally disordered”,71 or has an “intellectual disability”.72  The 
terms “mental disorder” and “intellectual disability” are defined in the MH(CAT)Act and 
ID(CCR)Act respectively, meaning satisfaction of this third condition depends on the 
relevant provisions and jurisprudence of those two statutes. 
 
Once these three prerequisites are satisfied, the court may order one of four therapeutic 
dispositions provided in s 34(1) of the CP(MIP)Act.  There are two orders of differing 
severity for each category of mental impairment.  These are known as “hybrid orders” or 
“purely therapeutic orders”. 
A The hybrid order (s 34(1)(a)) 
 
Section 34(1)(a) is the more severe or restrictive order.  It allows the court to sentence the 
impaired offender to a term of imprisonment but simultaneously order detention as a 
“special patient” in a “hospital” under the MH(CAT)Act,73 or as a “special care recipient” 
in a “secure facility” under the ID(CCR)Act.74  This is known as a hybrid order75 because 
it combines the normally separate concepts of punishment (in the form of a sentence of 
imprisonment) and therapy (in the form of an order for treatment).76  The order, by 
incorporating a finite term of imprisonment, allows the court to control the length of 
detention its subject will receive.77  As such, it is appropriate for mentally impaired 
offenders who are convicted of serious or violent offences,78 pose a high risk to the 
public,79 and for whom detention in prison is an insufficient risk reduction strategy 
(presumably on the basis that the risk posed is a result of the impairment, which cannot 
be addressed in prison).80  If the need for treatment or care ceases while under the s 
34(1)(a) order, but the term of imprisonment has not yet expired, the offender is 
  
70  Ibid, s 34(2). 
71  Ibid, s 34(3). 
72  Ibid, s 34(4). 
73  Ibid, s 34(1)(a)(i). 
74  Ibid, s 34(1)(a)(ii). 
75  AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2012) at 319. 
76  Robertson, above n 53, at [CM34.03]. 
77  R v Satherley [2007] NZCA 381, (2005) 25 FRNZ 709 at [23]. 
78  R v Goodlet [2011] NZCA 357, [2011] 3 NZLR 783 at [41]. 
79  Ibid, at [44]. 
80  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 216. 
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transferred to prison to complete the sentence.81  Conversely, if the sentence of 
imprisonment expires, but the need for treatment or care continues, the offender is 
reclassified a “patient” or “care recipient” and released in accordance with the civil 
release procedures specified in either the MH(CAT)Act or ID(CCR)Act.82 
B The purely therapeutic order (s 34(1)(b)) 
 
Alternatively, the court can impose a “purely therapeutic” order under s 34(1)(b) of the 
CP(MIP)Act.83  This means the court does not sentence the offender and, instead, orders 
treatment as a “patient” under the MH(CAT)Act,84 or care as a “care recipient” under the 
ID(CCR)Act.85  Accordingly, the court relinquishes all control of the length of the 
offender’s detention to the relevant clinicians.86  If the impairment is easily addressed, the 
offender’s release may be granted after a relatively short period as compared with the 
term of imprisonment that would otherwise have been imposed.87  Conversely, if the 
impairment is relatively static, the length of the offender’s “purely therapeutic” detention 
risks becoming disproportionate to the severity of their offending.88 
 
This highlights the difficulty of reconciling the principle of proportionality with 
therapeutic orders, as the length of detention required for treatment bears no relationship 
to the offence, but instead to the impairment the offender labours under.  However, given 
therapeutic orders exist to ensure offenders who need treatment or care actually receive it 
rather than languish in prison,89 some compromise to proportionality is surely acceptable. 
 
  
81  Zainab Al-Alawi (ed) Brookers Family Law – Incapacity (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at 
[MH2.27.24]. 
82  Sabine Visser “Assessment and Care of Offenders with Mental Impairment” in Fred Seymour, 
Suzanne Blackwell, and John Thorburn (eds) Psychology and the Law in Aotearoa New Zealand 
(New Zealand Psychological Society, Wellington, 2011) 193 at 199. 
83  Simester and Brookbanks, above n 75, at 320. 
84  Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 34(1)(b)(i). 
85  Ibid, s 34(1)(b)(ii). 
86  R v Goodlet, above n 78, at [23]. 
87  This risk, and the corresponding reluctance of some courts to order a therapeutic disposition (even 
where the offender clearly required it), was the impetus behind development of the s 34(1)(a) orders 
which were not available in the statutory predecessor to the CP(MIP)Act 2003: Criminal Justice 
Amendment Bill (No 7) 1999 (328-2) (select committee report) at 8. 
88  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 204. 
89  Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 7) 1999 (328-2) (select committee report) at 9. 
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Section 34(1)(b) orders are not available for all types of offending.  Because a s 34(1)(b) 
order places the offender entirely outside the control of the justice system, the courts do 
not consider it appropriate for serious or violent offenders.  The Court of Appeal has 
described the s 34(1)(b) order as a “more benevolent option” appropriate for “less serious 
offenders”.90  Accordingly, sexual or violent offending should only be addressed through 
a s 34(1)(a) order or a sentence of imprisonment.91  Thus, for the cohort of offenders that 
this paper addresses, the hybrid order is the only realistic disposition. 
C Treatment and punishment: theoretical contradictions in the s 34 orders 
 
Despite the obvious benefit in providing therapeutic diversion from prison for offenders 
with health needs, the s 34 orders are criticised as conceptually incoherent.  This is 
largely because, notwithstanding their therapeutic intent, the orders have a punitive effect 
as they still result in a person’s involuntary confinement.92 
 
The hybrid orders in particular are seen to present this tension as they contain an explicit 
punitive component in including a finite sentence of imprisonment, which sits uneasily 
with a corresponding provision for treatment.  Brookbanks considers that by 
simultaneously providing for treatment and punishment, the order “marries” together two 
incompatible notions.93  How can a court, on one hand, identify an offender’s impairment 
as rendering them in need of compulsory care or treatment but, on the other, consider 
them an appropriate subject for a sentence of imprisonment?  As identified above, mental 
impairment renders the traditional rationales of imprisonment futile as the mentally 
impaired person lacks the cognitive capacity to process the purpose of punishment or 
amend their behaviour in response to it.  This means that the s 34(1)(a) order risks 
contravening the principles of sentencing and inappropriately subjecting mentally 
impaired persons to harsh penal sanctions. 
 
While this theoretical tension is acknowledged, it is argued here that the s 34(1)(a) orders 
are justified.  The orders strike a workable balance between two competing policy 
objectives presented by mentally impaired offenders, incapacitation and rehabilitation.  In 
doing so, the orders ensure therapeutic dispositions are granted to violent and sexual 
offenders as well as to less serious offenders.  Where a mentally impaired person has 
  
90  R v Satherley, above n 77, at [29]. 
91  Ibid, at [31]. 
92  Al-Alawi, above n 81, at [MH2.27.28]. 
93  Brookbanks, above n 44, at 217. 
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committed sexual or violent offences, an indisputable need to protect the public from that 
person exists.  Accordingly, the courts have a legitimate interest to ensure such offenders 
are not released earlier than is warranted by the nature of their offending.  
Simultaneously, the fact the offender is mentally impaired raises the need for treatment or 
care.  For a court to satisfy both objectives some control over the nature and length of 
therapeutic detention is necessary and this is only provided with the hybrid order. 
 
The historical use of therapeutic dispositions supports this.  Before the introduction of the 
hybrid order, the courts were reluctant to grant therapeutic dispositions for serious sexual 
or violent offenders, even where they had clear treatment needs.94  Consequently, 
mentally impaired persons who had committed serious offences were imprisoned to 
ensure a minimum period of detention, despite imprisonment compromising 
rehabilitation, exacerbating the impairment, and restricting subsequent transfer into 
treatment or care.95  As such, the hybrid order ensures greater numbers of impaired 
offenders actually receive the treatment or care they need. 
 
In sum, by allowing the court to retain control over the length of detention through 
imposing a sentence of imprisonment but simultaneously requiring treatment through a 
hospital order, a pragmatic balance between the need to provide treatment and the need to 
protect the public is achieved.  To the extent this increases the numbers of impaired 
persons diverted from prison, the hybrid order is surely positive.  Accordingly, some 
compromise to conceptual purity may be justified to ensure the courts actually employ 
therapeutic dispositions when sentencing serious sexual or violent offenders with health 
needs.  While such persons face transfer to prison if their therapeutic needs are addressed 
before parole eligibility, this may not be inherently inappropriate given the severity of 
their index offence and the fact their mental impairment has first been ameliorated. 
 
VI Parameters on Therapeutic Dispositions: “Intellectual Disability” and 
“Mental Disorder” 
 
Eligibility for therapeutic dispositions is limited by the threshold definitions of 
“intellectual disability” or “mental disorder”.  An offender must satisfy one of these 
  
94  Al-Alawi, above n 81, at [MH2.27.24]; Criminal Justice Amendment Bill (No 7) 1999 (328-2) 
(select committee report) at 8. 
95  Office of the Auditor General Performance Audit Report: Mental Health Services for Prisoners 
(2008) at [3.18] and [3.19]. 
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definitions before the court has jurisdiction to grant a s 34 order.96  This constraint on 
jurisdiction is interesting as, in all other respects, the CP(MIP)Act employs the wide and 
undefined term of “mental impairment” which applies, for example, when claiming 
unfitness to stand trial.97  However, therapeutic dispositions are restricted to these two 
forms of mental impairment and other potentially deserving categories of mental 
impairment, such as ABI, are excluded.  The two qualifying definitions, and how they 
exclude ABI from the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction, are discussed below. 
A The meaning of “intellectual disability” 
 
“Intellectual disability” is defined in s 7 of the ID(CCR)Act.  The definition was 
developed by the American Association of Mental Retardation and is clinical rather than 
legal.98  It requires a person to have a “permanent impairment” with three 
characteristics:99 significantly sub-average general intelligence,100 as measured by an 
intelligence quotient (IQ) of 70 or less;101 significant deficits in adaptive functioning in at 
least two specified areas,102 such as self-care and social skills;103 and, finally, the 
impairment must have become apparent during the person’s development,104 defined as 
being before the age of 18 years.105 
 
The inclusion of an IQ measurement in the definition is controversial.106  IQ test results 
can vary depending on a person’s stress levels or fatigue and also with environmental 
  
96  Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, ss 34(3) and (4). 
97  Ibid, s 4(1). 
98  Olive Webb, Mhairi Duff and Mike Reed “Assessment and Care of Offenders with Intellectual 
Disabilities” in Fred Seymour, Suzanne Blackwell and John Thorburn (eds) Psychology and the Law 
in Aotearoa New Zealand (New Zealand Psychological Society, Wellington, 2011) 205 at 207. 
99  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, s 7(1). 
100  Ibid, s 7(1)(a). 
101  Ibid, s 7(3). 
102  Ibid, s 7(1)(b). 
103  Ibid, ss 7(4)(b) and (d).  Other adaptive functioning skills include communication, health and safety, 
leisure and work. 
104  Ibid, s 7(1)(c). 
105  Ibid, s 7(5). 
106  17 submissions to the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill (as it was then) raised issue 
with this part of the definition.  The submitters were concerned about the standard testing used to 
determine IQ level, the narrowness of the IQ level, and the validity of IQ testing.  These concerns 
did not change the ultimate definition used in the Act but did result in an amendment allowing a 5% 
margin of error in testing:  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 1999 (329-2) (select 
committee report) at 4. 
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factors like time of day or place.107  As such, an intellectual disability can be “cured” 
upon re-testing,108 inappropriately shifting people inside and outside the therapeutic 
jurisdiction in a way that risks arbitrariness.  In addition, the orthodox IQ tests are seen as 
biased against certain types of mental impairment, such as brain injury, where cognitive 
functioning is disturbed in a way that is not captured in the methodology of standard IQ 
tests.109 
B ABI and intellectual disability 
 
While ABI and intellectual disability share some characteristics,110 the ID(CCR)Act’s 
definition of intellectual disability excludes ABI from the therapeutic jurisdiction in two 
ways.  First, ABI is specified in a list of conditions that, on their own, are excluded from 
the definition.111  To come within the definition, an ABI offender needs to have ABI as 
well as the other qualifying characteristics (making ABI a comorbidity to the intellectual 
disability).  The explanatory note to the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 
identified the reason for this exclusion was that ABI is “covered by the provisions of the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992”,112 presumably 
making it unnecessary to include ABI in the new therapeutic regime.  However, as 
explained below, ABI is not currently included within the scope of that Act. 
 
The second way the definition excludes ABI is through the inclusion of the IQ 
measurement.  An IQ test measures a person’s ability to solve problems or answer 
questions relative to other people’s ability to do the same.113  As such, it measures a form 
of cognitive capacity (intelligence based on the ability to reason) but not global cognition.  
This tends to exclude people with ABI, as demonstrated in R v Satherley.114 
 
Mr Satherley was a sexual offender with ABI resulting from a childhood car accident.  
He was found not to be intellectually disabled and so excluded from the therapeutic 
regime because his IQ was deemed (by a majority of clinicians) in excess of the upper 
limit of 70.  However, one of the clinicians disputed the use of orthodox IQ tests on 
  
107  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 25, at 38. 
108  Webb, Duff and Reed, above n 98, at 213. 
109  R v Satherley, above n 77, at [9]. 
110  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 25, at 40. 
111  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, s 8(1)(c). 
112  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 1999 (329-1) (explanatory note) at iii. 
113  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 25, at 36. 
114  R v Satherley, above n 77. 
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people with ABI.  Dr Irwin identified that as people with ABI have damage to some, but 
not all, parts of the brain, they will be biased in orthodox IQ tests as these tests measure 
average performance across a range of sub-tests of specific brain areas.115  A person with 
ABI tends to display markedly varying results across the sub-tests because of the 
localisation of damage.116  This pushes their average up and provides them a higher IQ.117  
As such, she advocated for the use of more complex neuropsychological tests to measure 
broader cognitive functioning and compensate for the orthodox test’s internal bias against 
ABI.118  On the basis of these tests, Dr Irwin found Mr Satherley intellectually 
disabled.119  The Court of Appeal disagreed with this approach and indicated that, on the 
basis of the statutory terms, the assessment should be limited to orthodox tests 
determining intelligence and not broader tests determining cognitive capacity.120  As 
such, despite Mr Satherley having executive dysfunction,121 he did not have an 
intellectual disability and should not have been given a therapeutic disposition.122  The 
Court noted Mr Satherley should have been sentenced to imprisonment.123 
1 R v Satherley: wrong, but right 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Satherley was arguably correct.  While it restricts 
the definition of intellectual disability to those with a very severe form of cognitive 
impairment, this is consistent with the statute’s strict terms,124 with the way practitioners 
understand the term,125 and with the different nature of treatment or care required for each 
form of cognitive impairment.126  People with ABI are likely to have had a much more 
diverse “lived experience” than people with a stereotypical form of intellectual disability 
  
115  Ibid, at [9]. 
116  Ibid. 
117  Ibid. 
118  Ibid, at [10]. 
119  Ibid. 
120  Ibid, at [20]. 
121  Ibid, at [16]. 
122  Ibid, at [20]. 
123  Ibid, at [32].  However, the Court of Appeal did not sentence Mr Satherley to imprisonment as he 
had responded well to the therapeutic regime in the interim period.  Accordingly, he was given a 
community sentence so he could continue to access the rehabilitative programmes available. 
124  Section 7(2) of the ID(CCR)Act specifies intelligence should be “assessed by applying standard 
psychometric tests generally used by clinicians”.  Section 7(3) then specifies “general intelligence” 
should be measured as an intelligence quotient, rather than as cognitive functioning. 
125  Interview with Hansen, above n 2. 
126  Interview with Foster, above n 2; Interview with Hansen, above n 2. 
23 Acquired Brain Injury and Serious Criminal Offenders: An Argument to Expand the Court’s Therapeutic Jurisdiction 
such as Downs Syndrome, meaning their abilities and the way they define themselves 
will be quite different.127 
 
In addition, while ABI is a permanent condition in the sense that damage to the brain 
cannot ever be completely undone, it has considerably more rehabilitation potential than 
intellectual disability.128  As such, people with ABI and people with intellectual disability 
should not necessarily receive equal dispositions or be classified as falling within a single 
framework.  ABI and intellectual disability are more appropriately seen as two sub-
groups within an umbrella term of “cognitive impairment” rather than as synonymous 
conditions justifying equal treatment.129 
 
Despite the technical correctness of excluding ABI from the definition of intellectual 
disability, Dr Irwin’s broader approach is attractive from a policy perspective.  R v 
Satherley highlights the risk for people who, while clearly mentally impaired and in need 
of treatment, fall outside the jurisdictional definitions required for a therapeutic 
disposition.  The Ministry of Health has itself identified that, in many cases, otherwise 
qualifying offenders are ineligible for therapeutic dispositions because their intellectual 
functioning is slightly higher than the statutory definition allows or their impairment is a 
result of ABI.130  Such people are consequently sent to prison where treatment or care is 
not guaranteed and where, by virtue of their mental impairment, they are vulnerable to 
harm.131  Therefore, having broad and flexible qualifying definitions that ensure people 
who need care or treatment actually receive it seems appropriate. 
 
However, this really calls for the development of a broader therapeutic jurisdiction, rather 
than a widening of the classification of intellectual disability.  Pushing larger groups of 
mentally impaired offenders into care for the intellectually disabled when they have 
different care and treatment needs is not a tenable solution to the problem. 
 
 
  
127  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 25, at 40. 
128  Ibid, at 41. 
129  Ibid, at 40 and 41. 
130  Ministry of Health “Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003” 
<www.moh.govt.nz>. 
131  Philip Brinded and Ceri Evans “Delivery of mental health services in prisons” in Warren 
Brookbanks and Sandy Simpson (eds) Psychiatry and the Law (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) 423 
at 432; National Health Committee, above n 3, at [7.4.1]. 
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C The meaning of “mental disorder” 
 
The second threshold definition for a therapeutic disposition is “mental disorder” under 
the MH(CAT)Act.  This is a particularly complex definition and, as such, has been the 
subject of considerable academic analysis.  The complexity is, partly, a result of its 
application in the civil jurisdiction where the definition has been interpreted very widely 
to include conditions not recognised as orthodox psychiatric illnesses, such as personality 
disorder and brain injury.132  This is problematic as such conditions are not currently 
treatable in the psychiatric facilities an order under the MH(CAT)Act requires a patient to 
be detained in.  By contrast, in the criminal jurisdiction the definition has been interpreted 
much more narrowly, with brain injury and personality disorder not accepted as mental 
disorders for the purpose of therapeutic dispositions on the basis that treatment for such 
conditions is not available in MH(CAT)Act facilities.133 
 
It is argued here that the criminal jurisdiction’s approach is preferable and the definition, 
in both jurisdictions, should be limited to conditions which are treatable in the facility the 
patient is to be detained in.  Under this analysis, ABI is excluded from the current 
definition of mental disorder.  This accords with the practice of criminal courts when 
considering an ABI offender’s eligibility for therapeutic dispositions and is also 
consistent with the scheme and purpose of the MH(CAT)Act and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”).  This argument is developed below by first examining 
the definition of mental disorder, secondly, discussing “treatment” under the 
MH(CAT)Act, and then establishing why an additional requirement of “treatability” 
should be read into the definition.  Finally, in subpart D, the exclusion of ABI from the 
definition of mental disorder is considered. 
1 The definition of “mental disorder” and its consequences 
 
Unlike the definition of “intellectual disability” in the ID(CCR)Act, the definition of 
“mental disorder” is legal rather than clinical.134  As such, its components do not 
  
132  Sylvia Bell and Warren Brookbanks Mental Health Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2005) at 45; and see Ministry of Health v M, above n 36; and see Re JAB MHRT 
07/020, 20 March 2007. 
133  See Blackwood v R [2011] NZCA 143 and R v Simmonds HC Christchurch CRI-2010-009-716, 11 
November 2010. 
134  Sylvia Bell “Defining Mental Disorder” in Warren Brookbanks and Sandy Simpson (eds) Psychiatry 
and the Law (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) 41 at 56. 
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necessarily equate to recognisable clinical terms and no specific diagnosis is required for 
the term to be satisfied.135  The definition is as follows:136 
 
…an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by 
delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it – 
(a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; or (b) seriously 
diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or herself. 
 
The definition contains two elements, both of which must be proved for the 
MH(CAT)Act’s jurisdiction to be invoked.  First, the assessed person must have an 
abnormal state of mind as determined by the presence of certain symptoms, such as 
delusions, or disorders of mood, perception, volition or cognition.137  Second, as a 
consequence of the abnormal state of mind, the person must constitute a danger to him or 
herself or to others, or must exhibit a seriously diminished capacity for self-care.138  
However, a proven mental disorder does not automatically invoke the Act’s coercive 
powers.  Once a mental disorder has been established, the court must also be satisfied a 
compulsory treatment order is “necessary” (the necessity test).139 
 
If these prerequisites are satisfied, the mentally disordered person will be subject to an 
“inpatient order” or a “community treatment order”.  If an inpatient order, the person is 
compulsorily treated in a “hospital”,140 defined as a premise certified by the Director-
General of Health to provide mental healthcare.141  In practice, this is a dedicated 
psychiatric hospital or a psychiatric ward in a general hospital.  If a community treatment 
order, the person must accept treatment administered by a health practitioner in their own 
home or a community facility.142 
2 What is treatment? 
 
“Treatment” under the MH(CAT)Act has recently been interpreted as limited to clinical 
care that treats the “underlying cause” or “symptoms” of a mental disorder.143  This may 
  
135  Al-Alawi, above n 81, at [MH2.13.01]. 
136  Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2(1). 
137  Bell, above n 134, at 46. 
138  Ibid. 
139  Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 27(3). 
140  Ibid, s 30(1). 
141  Ibid, s 2(1). 
142  Ibid, s 29(1). 
143  Canterbury District Health Board v MH [2012] NZFC 4432, [2013] NZFLR 312 at [59]. 
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include pharmacological treatment, psychotherapy, counselling, occupational therapy, 
rehabilitation or nursing care.144  However, such treatment must be administered for the 
direct purpose of managing the mental disorder or be ancillary to such management.145  
Treatment does not include the provision of healthcare solely or primarily for the purpose 
of ensuring physical care such as sanitation, feeding, or behaviour management.146  As 
such, legitimate treatment under the MH(CAT)Act is limited to healthcare which 
remedies the mental disorder that justified invoking the MH(CAT)Act’s coercive powers. 
3 Interpreting “mental disorder” with a “treatability” requirement 
 
Because the definition of mental disorder is legal and not clinical it is appropriately 
shaped by principles of statutory interpretation.  Two such principles are purpose and 
rights consistency.  When applying these principles it becomes clear that, while no 
specific provision in the MH(CAT)Act requires it, the disorder’s “treatability” in the 
facility the patient would be detained in should constrain whether the definition is 
satisfied in a given case. 
 
(a) Statutory purpose 
 
It is an elementary principle of statutory interpretation that legislative meaning should be 
identified in light of the statute’s text and purpose.147  As such, the interpretation of 
“mental disorder” should be influenced by the purpose of the MH(CAT)Act and the text 
of its provisions.  Purpose can be ascertained through a variety of factors, including the 
statute’s long title, which reads:148 
 
An Act to redefine the circumstances in which … persons may be subjected to compulsory 
psychiatric assessment and treatment … and generally to reform and consolidate the law relating to 
the assessment and treatment of persons suffering from mental disorder. 
 
This indicates a key purpose of the MH(CAT)Act is to facilitate and regulate the 
treatment of mentally disordered persons.  As such, for the statute’s definition to be 
consistent with its purpose, it should result in treatment of the particular mental disorder 
  
144  Ibid, at [60]. 
145  Ibid, at [59] and [60]. 
146  Ibid, at [68]. 
147  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
148  Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, Long Title (emphasis added). 
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at issue, something not possible if the person is detained in a psychiatric hospital when 
not suffering from psychiatric illness. 
 
The statutory text also illustrates the centrality of treatment to the MH(CAT)Act and, 
therefore, to its threshold definition.  First, the term “compulsory treatment order” used 
throughout the MH(CAT)Act149 underscores the focus on treatment.  It would do violence 
to language to invoke a “compulsory treatment order” in respect of a person who is 
untreatable in the facility an order requires their detention in.  Other provisions whose 
text emphasises the centrality of treatment include s 27(4)(a) which requires a court, 
when imposing a community treatment order, to “be satisfied … the service provides care 
and treatment … appropriate to the needs of the patient”.150  Treatment is again 
emphasised in s 30(1) where detention of a patient under an inpatient order is noted as 
“for the purposes of treatment”.  This demonstrates that one of the main purposes of the 
MH(CAT)Act is to ensure treatment of the persons subject to it.  Accordingly, the 
meaning of “mental disorder” must be coloured by that purpose. 
 
A number of decisions support this interpretation.  In Waitemata Health v Attorney 
General Elias CJ stated “[t]he only purpose of compulsory status is to achieve … 
treatment”.151  As such, in order for the definition to be consistent with its purpose, it 
must be a conduit to treatment.  Similarly, in R v Simmonds, Fogarty J found that the 
MH(CAT)Act could not be used to provide a therapeutic disposition for a mentally 
disturbed offender whose condition was not amenable to treatment.152  Fogarty J noted 
that psychiatrists providing assessments for the purposes of the Act “are reluctant to 
define a person as suffering from a mental disorder unless they think such a 
determination will assist in any treatment”.153 
 
Some decisions of the Mental Health Review Tribunal also support a requirement of 
treatability.  In Re DG the Tribunal noted, “in considering the issue of mental disorder it 
is imperative that decision makers never lose sight of the benchmark of treatment”,154 and 
considered the various symptoms of mental disorder specified in s 2(1) of the 
MH(CAT)Act must be “amenable to treatment” to “come within the Act”.155  The 
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Tribunal held that “as it is the mental disorder which is subject to treatment, it is 
axiomatic that it must be amenable to treatment”.156  Accordingly, the patient’s ABI-
related executive dysfunction, for which no effective treatment was available in the 
psychiatric hospital he was detained in, did not amount to a “mental disorder” justifying 
compulsory treatment.157 
 
(b) Rights Consistency 
 
A second principle of statutory interpretation is rights consistency.158  As finding “mental 
disorder” satisfied where it does not result in appropriate treatment may result in a breach 
of rights, this also supports an interpretation of the definition in which treatment is a 
requisite component.  Two rights illustrate this point: the right to treatment and the right 
to be free from arbitrary detention. 
 
First, the MH(CAT)Act provides a right to “medical treatment and other health care 
appropriate to [the patient’s] condition”.159  This upholds relevant international principles 
which provide persons detained for mental health purposes with “the right to receive such 
health and social care as is appropriate to his or her health needs”.160  Thus, while no right 
to treatment exists for general healthcare consumers,161 it is clearly applicable to persons 
detained under mental health legislation. 
 
The rationale for this is twofold.  First, when the state takes a person into its physical 
custody and thereby deprives that person of the ability to provide for his or her own 
needs, unique rights and duties arise in respect of that person.162  These rights and duties 
are principally for the purpose of preventing the detained person from experiencing 
suffering or harm while under physical control of an authority.163  The second reason 
relates to the purpose of the deprivation of liberty.  A person detained under mental 
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health legislation is detained for the purpose of treatment.  Accordingly, if such treatment 
is not provided, the reason for their detention is lost.164 
 
The right to treatment means a treatability requirement should be interpreted as part of 
the definition of mental disorder.  As discussed above, the definition provides jurisdiction 
for the Act’s powers and, if it is found to be satisfied in respect of a person for whom 
treatment is not available in the facility the MH(CAT)Act requires their detention in, the 
person’s right to treatment is automatically frustrated.  Such a consequence could not 
have been Parliament’s intention. 
 
Second, the right to be free from arbitrary detention is affirmed in s 22 of the NZBORA.  
Arbitrary detention occurs where a person is detained unlawfully, unless the detention is 
necessary for safety.165  It also occurs where a person is detained lawfully, but the 
detention is unjustifiable as the original reasons for the detention are no longer valid;166 
the detention is not based on “an adequate determining principle” or rationale;167 or it 
fails to comply with the statute granting the relevant detention power.168 
 
Where a person is detained under the MH(CAT)Act (a detention for the purpose of 
treatment) but treatment cannot be provided in the relevant facility, the detention may be 
arbitrary on the basis that it lacks an appropriate rationale or breaches its empowering 
legislation.169  Without treatment, detention becomes purely custodial, yet custody is not 
an appropriate function of the health system.170  Purely custodial detention in a health 
facility would lack an adequate rationale and risk illegality.171  Equally, as discussed 
above, the MH(CAT)Act emphasises treatment and therefore detention without treatment 
may be ultra vires.  This means that for detention under the mental health regime to be 
justified (and therefore not arbitrary) it should be “consequent on a treatable 
condition”.172  As such, the right to be free from arbitrary detention also supports an 
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interpretation of “mental disorder” as requiring treatability in the facility the patient is 
detained in. 
4 Why treatability should be a component of mental disorder and not the necessity test 
 
The preceding sections of the paper have argued that treatability should be interpreted as 
a requirement of the definition of mental disorder.  However, some academics argue a 
treatability requirement should not be interpreted as falling within the definition but, 
rather, within the separate necessity test.173  This is inappropriate. 
 
The necessity test, axiomatically, asks whether compulsory treatment is necessary “in all 
the circumstances of the case”.174  It is focused on questions such as whether compulsion 
is required to achieve treatment or whether voluntary compliance is viable,175 and 
whether the mentally disordered person has caregivers or family who could “contain the 
danger or compensate for seriously diminished capacity”176 rendering compulsory 
treatment unnecessary.  As such, it is not a test that asks whether the mental disorder is 
treatable in the relevant facility but, rather, whether compulsion is required to achieve 
treatment. 
 
Supporting this, the necessity test only applies when the court grants a compulsory 
treatment order.  It is not part of the test for release from compulsory status, which has 
been held by the Court of Appeal to be based solely on whether or not the person is, or 
remains, “mentally disordered”.177  In addition, the Mental Health Review Tribunal has 
held a person for whom treatment is no longer efficacious should be released from 
compulsory status.178  This is logical as without the ability to release a person when 
treatment is unsuccessful, they could be detained indefinitely. 
 
As such, if treatability was found to fall within the necessity test, rather than the 
definition of mental disorder, a person’s lack of response to treatment, or the 
unavailability of treatment, would not be legitimate grounds for release.  If the person 
continued to present an abnormal state of mind but could not be treated under the Act, 
they could be detained in perpetuity, risking arbitrary detention.  A person who poses a 
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risk of harm, but who cannot be treated, is an appropriate candidate for some form of 
preventive detention, but not for detention in a treatment facility.179  As such, the 
availability of treatment in the facility a person is to be detained in should be a 
component of the definition of mental disorder, facilitating exit from the MH(CAT)Act’s 
regime where treatment is not efficacious, as well as where it is successful and the 
disorder has abated. 
5 How a treatability requirement may impact the civil jurisdiction 
 
While the civil jurisdiction is outside the scope of this paper, placing a limitation on the 
definition of mental disorder in the MH(CAT)Act would also limit its scope.  The 
MH(CAT)Act’s civil jurisdiction is used to order compulsory treatment for non-offenders 
(and offenders who commit non-imprisonable offences) whose mental state is such that 
they pose a risk to themselves or others.180  A treatability requirement may mean 
“untreatable” mental illnesses, such as personality disorder,181 and disorders for which 
treatment services are not currently provided in MH(CAT)Act facilities, such as brain 
injury,182 are excluded from the Act.  Persons with these conditions would therefore not 
be able to be detained when exhibiting high risk behaviour. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the requirement for treatability should still be pursued.  As 
demonstrated above, the MH(CAT)Act’s purpose is to facilitate treatment (and 
assessment for the purpose of treatment), not to detain people with antisocial behaviour 
who have not committed a criminal offence warranting custody.  If the MH(CAT)Act is 
used to detain such persons under civil orders, it risks being a vehicle for arbitrary 
detention.183  The use of the MH(CAT)Act’s civil jurisdiction in respect of brain injury is 
discussed at subpart D4 below and expands on this discussion. 
D ABI and “mental disorder” 
 
While ABI-related executive dysfunction manifests some of the phenomenology of a 
“mental disorder”, it falls outside the definition’s current scope.  This is because 
treatment for ABI-related executive dysfunction (as opposed to a comorbid mental 
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illness) is not currently provided in the hospitals an inpatient order diverts offenders into.  
Accordingly, while ABI has significant rehabilitation potential,184 it is an “untreatable” 
condition under the current MH(CAT)Act regime and so falls outside the gateway 
definition.  This means ABI offenders are excluded from the court’s therapeutic 
jurisdiction.  The reasons for this are examined below. 
1 Security classifications and secure treatment facilities 
 
When transferred from the justice to health jurisdiction (either when transferred from 
prison185 or when given a therapeutic disposition) an offender must be held as an 
“inpatient”.186  The inpatient status means the person is subject to restrictions on their 
liberty while detained in the facility.  As such, where persons are held as inpatients, the 
treatment centre effectively provides both a custodial function and a therapeutic one.  A 
person who receives a hybrid order receives an additional security classification, the 
categorisation as a “special patient”.187  This flags that person as one who not only has 
restrictions on their day-to-day liberty but who also cannot be released solely when the 
clinician deems them therapeutically ready as occurs for other inpatients.188 
 
Inpatients and special patients must be detained for treatment in a “hospital”.189  A 
“hospital” is a premise certified by the Director-General of Health to provide mental 
healthcare, in compliance with service standards and any conditions imposed by the 
Director-General.190  In practice, this means inpatients and special patients are detained 
and treated in forensic mental health units, the only “hospitals” with the necessary 
security certification to house criminal offenders.191  There are six such units in New 
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Zealand,192 which primarily house and treat people with severe psychiatric conditions 
such as schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, and psychosis.193 
2 How ABI is untreatable under the MH(CAT)Act 
 
Rehabilitation for ABI-related executive dysfunction is not specifically provided in any 
of the six forensic mental health units.194  There is also no ABI rehabilitation facility in 
New Zealand that can provide the security necessary to fulfil the custodial, as well as 
therapeutic, functions involved in treating special patients.195  There are, of course, 
dedicated ABI rehabilitation centres that provide treatment to the non-offending 
population.196  However, such services cannot accept criminal offenders, and do not 
accept patients referred under the MH(CAT)Act regime because of the risk posed to other 
patients.197  Accordingly, there is a gap in the health system for offenders with ABI as no 
secure facilities exist to which they can be diverted under a therapeutic disposition (or 
indeed under an inpatient order issued in the MH(CAT)Act’s civil jurisdiction). 
 
Because ABI cannot be treated in inpatient facilities under the current MH(CAT)Act 
regime, it falls outside the gateway definition of mental disorder.  Where the definition is 
not a conduit to treatment it fails to meet its statutory purpose and risks amounting to 
arbitrary detention.  A person should not be classified as mentally disordered solely for a 
custodial purpose, as this is the function of the corrections system and not the health 
system.  Equally, psychiatric units are inappropriate places to house people with ABI-
related executive dysfunction.198  Such people have specific treatment and rehabilitation 
needs deriving from ABI and are therefore not best treated as general psychiatric 
patients.199  Housing people with ABI in psychiatric units may increase their stress and 
result in social stigmatisation, impeding rehabilitation and reintegration back into the 
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community.200  It is therefore appropriate that ABI is excluded from the definition of 
mental disorder under the current MH(CAT)Act regime. 
 
For completeness, a caveat to the above discussion should be noted.  As identified in Part 
III, ABI can cause psychosis or lead to other mental illness such as schizophrenia or 
bipolar disorder.201  When this is the case, classification as “mental disorder” under the 
MH(CAT)Act is appropriate.  In such a situation, the definition is a conduit to treatment, 
as psychiatric care in certified hospitals is appropriate treatment for such conditions.202  
However, in the more common cases, where ABI leads to executive dysfunction, 
psychiatric care is not best practice and the preceding argument stands. 
3 Blackwood v R: an illustration of the problem 
 
Unlike in the civil jurisdiction, ABI has never been found to satisfy the definition of 
mental disorder for a therapeutic disposition under s 34 of the CP(MIP)Act.203  This gap 
in the therapeutic jurisdiction is well illustrated by Blackwood v R. 
 
Jesse Blackwood was involved in a serious car accident when he was 18 years old and 
suffered a TBI.204  As a consequence, he developed executive dysfunction including 
cognitive deficits such as slowness in information processing, memory problems and 
inflexible thinking patterns; socio-adaptive problems including difficulties in social-
communication; and volitional problems including impulsivity and deficits in self-
monitoring and self-correcting his behaviour.205 
 
One year after his accident, Mr Blackwood committed an act of sexual violation by rape 
against his former girlfriend.206  He appeared to show little understanding that what he 
had done was wrong and, over the course of his conviction and sentencing, reverted 
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between accepting responsibility for the offending and expressing remorse,207 and 
denying the offending had happened at all.208  Mr Blackwood’s executive dysfunction 
also meant he posed a risk of harm to others: he had difficulty controlling his behaviour, 
had not accepted his wrongdoing, and posed a risk of recidivism for both sexual and 
violent offending.209 
 
Three psychological experts engaged by the court were unanimous Mr Blackwood’s ABI 
played “some role” in the offending.210  Further, the experts were unanimous he required 
specialist brain injury rehabilitation to address his cognitive and behavioural 
difficulties,211 and to reduce the risk of harm he posed to the public as a consequence of 
his executive dysfunction.212  All the experts also identified prison was inappropriate for 
Mr Blackwood as he could not receive the necessary treatment there,213 and would be at a 
high risk of harm from other inmates due to his behaviour.214 
 
This fact pattern reveals Mr Blackwood as an offender presenting clear therapeutic need, 
making him an appropriate candidate for a therapeutic disposition to ensure treatment for 
his impairment in a secure environment.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged this was the 
case.215  However, because his mental impairment resulted from ABI, Mr Blackwood 
“fell between the cracks” of the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction,216 and as such, rather 
than being treated in a therapeutic regime, he was imprisoned.  The reasons for this are 
discussed below. 
 
First, Mr Blackwood fell outside the definition of intellectual disability.217  His ABI 
occurred at the age of 18 (and was therefore outside the “developmental” stage) and his 
IQ was in excess of the maximum limit of 70.  Second, Mr Blackwood fell outside the 
definition of mental disorder.  The expert health assessors differed in their individual 
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assessment of Mr Blackwood on this ground.218  However, the Court of Appeal noted that 
as ABI-related executive dysfunction could not be treated under the MH(CAT)Act 
regime,219 reconciling the differing views of the experts on whether he met the 
phenomenology of mental disorder under the MH(CAT)Act was unnecessary.220  
Diversion into a forensic mental health unit would be “inappropriate for the current needs 
of Mr Blackwood, which are specifically related to acquired executive dysfunction.  
Thus, a mental healthcare facility … is not a suitable ongoing treatment setting for 
someone with traumatic brain injury”.221 
 
As such, the Court of Appeal implicitly applied a treatability requirement to the definition 
of mental disorder and found Mr Blackwood fell outside its therapeutic jurisdiction as his 
mental impairment was untreatable in the current therapeutic regime.  The Court of 
Appeal noted its surprise at the absence of any secure ABI rehabilitation facility in New 
Zealand, given the numbers of brain injured offenders in this country.222  However, this 
meant the Court had no choice but to sentence Mr Blackwood to a term of imprisonment, 
despite the recognised inappropriateness of that course of action.223 
 
Blackwood v R illustrates a problem with the current therapeutic jurisdiction.  As ABI is 
untreatable in secure MH(CAT)Act facilities, and explicitly excluded from the 
ID(CCR)Act, it is effectively excluded from the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction.  
Consequently, persons like Mr Blackwood who suffer from an obvious mental 
impairment that renders them unsuitable for prison and in need of treatment are ineligible 
for therapeutic sentences.  In the circumstances, the best the Court could do was mitigate 
Mr Blackwood’s sentence so as to make him eligible for parole earlier and flag the need 
for treatment to the Parole Board, in the hope the Board would grant him parole on the 
condition he attend community-based ABI rehabilitation.224 
 
However, even with this relatively sympathetic approach, Mr Blackwood was subject to a 
sentence of four years and three months’ imprisonment, a significant period to wait for 
treatment, even if mitigated by early parole.225  The experts engaged in the case noted a 
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risk this delay would “increase the challenges for Mr Blackwood” in achieving his long-
term rehabilitation.226  In addition, on the basis of interviews conducted for this research, 
it is unclear whether community-based rehabilitation services would even accept Mr 
Blackwood, given the risk posed to the non-offender patient population.227  This clearly 
underscores the need to establish secure ABI rehabilitation centres that high risk persons 
can be detained and treated in. 
4 ABI as a mental disorder for the purpose of civil commitment 
 
In contrast to the criminal jurisdiction, a small number of decisions in the civil 
jurisdiction have found the definition of mental disorder satisfied by people with ABI.  
As the MH(CAT)Act’s threshold definition should be the same for both jurisdictions, two 
of these decisions, Re JAB and Ministry of Health v M, are discussed.228  These decisions, 
while demonstrating a pragmatic or creative approach to the problem of ABI in the 
MH(CAT)Act regime, risk misuse of the MH(CAT)Act’s powers.  Rather than squeezing 
people exhibiting risky behaviour into a framework inappropriate for their needs, the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal and its appellate courts ought to exclude these cases from 
its jurisdiction and flag the problem with the Ministry of Health so appropriate treatment 
facilities can be established to cater for both offenders and non-offenders with ABI. 
 
In Re JAB and Ministry of Health v M the Tribunal and appellate court, respectively, 
found the definition of mental disorder satisfied by ABI.  Their reasoning was as follows.  
First, the phenomenological limb was satisfied as the subject person’s executive 
dysfunction manifested symptoms consistent with disordered cognition.229  The second 
dangerousness limb was also met, as the subject person either constituted a danger to 
others through their violent behaviour,230 or presented a seriously diminished capacity for 
self-care.231  Accordingly, both elements of the definition were satisfied, as was the 
necessity test, and therefore, inpatient orders were issued. 
 
However, in both cases the decision-maker acknowledged the treatment needs of the 
patient could not be provided in the psychiatric hospital at which he was to be 
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detained.232  In Re JAB the Tribunal noted the person “was not well placed in hospital”,233 
and the expert clinician stated it “was not an appropriate setting for him”.234  Despite this, 
the order was seen as important to secure custody, with the expectation that community-
based ABI treatment could subsequently be provided.235  These cases demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the current MH(CAT)Act regime for ABI.  Inpatient orders do not result in 
the subject person’s treatment as there are no secure hospitals certified under the 
MH(CAT)Act that provide ABI rehabilitation.  Accordingly, the orders, rather than being 
therapeutic become solely custodial and simply serve a risk-management function.  This 
misuses the MH(CAT)Act’s powers, which are designed for the purpose of achieving 
treatment, and means compulsory treatment orders become a vehicle for rights violations. 
 
On this basis, conditions that are not treatable under the MH(CAT)Act regime should fall 
outside its threshold definition.  The inadequacy of the MH(CAT)Act regime to cater for 
ABI is a policy problem that requires action by the Ministry of Health and not a creative 
but inappropriate use of dispositions by decision-makers.  While this more restricted 
approach may have unfortunate results in an individual case (such as the imprisonment of 
an impaired person), the approach taken by the criminal courts as evidenced in 
Blackwood v R is more appropriate. 
 
VII Imprisoning ABI Offenders: Why the Therapeutic Jurisdiction Needs 
Reform 
 
The current exclusion of serious ABI offenders from the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction 
means they are subject to imprisonment.  However, imprisoning ABI offenders also 
raises issues.  Such persons have high health needs, often requiring specialist 
neurological rehabilitation which may involve medical or psychiatric treatment, cognitive 
behavioural therapy, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and 
counselling.236  In addition, prisoners with ABI often pose behavioural issues for 
custodial staff.  Due to cognitive deficits, ABI offenders may struggle to understand 
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prison rules and have difficulty following instructions.237  Due to impulsivity and 
increased aggression, they may become violent when confronted by prison staff or other 
inmates.238  This leads to increased fights and assaults (where the ABI offender is either 
perpetrator or victim) and the increased use of in-prison disciplinary measures such as 
physical restraints or punishments.239  As such, imprisoning ABI offenders (whether the 
prison service is aware an inmate has ABI or not) strains prison staff and resources. 
 
In light of the above, it is argued here that the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction needs to be 
expanded to better accommodate ABI offenders and avoid their imprisonment.  The 
argument is based on three grounds.  First, prisoners’ statutory right to treatment in s 75 
of the Corrections Act 2004, arguably breached by the status quo.  Second, the potential 
for imprisoning ABI offenders to constitute ill treatment, violating the NZBORA.  Third, 
an analogy is drawn between the current position of ABI offenders and the pre-
ID(CCR)Act position of intellectually disabled offenders, to demonstrate why expanding 
the therapeutic regime is appropriate on policy grounds. 
A Prisoners’ right to treatment and healthcare in prison 
 
As with mental health detainees, prisoners have a right to treatment that does not exist for 
the general population.  This is provided in s 75 of the Corrections Act 2004 which states 
prisoners are “entitled to receive medical treatment that is reasonably necessary”.240  This 
treatment must be “reasonably equivalent to the standard of health care available to the 
public” (the equivalence of care principle).241  The right to treatment reflects international 
principles,242 and is an effort by the state to realise its duties when depriving a person of 
liberty.  Deprivation of liberty prevents a person from accessing healthcare for 
themselves and, accordingly, when the state exercises its power of incarceration, it 
assumes a duty to provide all necessary care to ensure the incarcerated person’s needs are 
met.243  As such, a prisoner’s right to treatment is matched by a corresponding duty on 
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the state to ensure such treatment is provided.  If treatment is not provided, a prisoner 
may be able to argue breach of statutory duty or a rights violation.244 
1 The delivery of healthcare in prison 
 
In New Zealand, in-prison healthcare is delivered through a complex system.  The 
Department of Corrections holds responsibility for delivering prisoners’ primary 
healthcare.245  This includes general frontline health services and primary mental health 
services normally obtained through a general practitioner or community nurse.246  The 
Ministry of Health has general responsibility for providing prisoners’ secondary and 
tertiary health services.247  The Ministry of Health provides this through District Health 
Boards (“DHBs”) who offer specialist medical care, hospital and complex surgical care, 
alcohol and drug services, and specialist mental health services.248  However, access to 
these services requires referral from a general practitioner,249 making it contingent on 
access to quality primary health services that identify need.  Finally, the Accident 
Compensation Corporation also provides secondary and tertiary health services for 
prisoners250 where treatment or rehabilitation is required for an illness or injury satisfying 
s 26 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001.251  However, as with DHB-funded 
secondary or tertiary care, specialist treatment for prisoners through the Accident 
Compensation regime requires the prisoner to be referred through an in-prison primary 
health provider and so access to treatment is again contingent on the quality of primary 
healthcare available. 
 
 
  
244  The success of any such claim is obviously uncertain. 
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(6th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) 21 at 42.  Prisoners lose any entitlement to monetary 
compensation under the Accident Compensation regime when they are incarcerated but do not lose 
their entitlement to treatment or rehabilitation services unless the personal injury was acquired 
during the course of committing an offence: Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 121(1) and 
122(1). 
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2 ABI rehabilitation in prison: a breach of the right to treatment 
 
The current provision of healthcare for prisoners with ABI may breach the right to 
treatment in s 75 of the Corrections Act 2004.  This is illustrated by two points: 
inadequate identification of need and lack of equivalence of care.  First, a prisoner with 
ABI is unlikely to be identified as suffering from ABI while in prison and, therefore, is 
unlikely to be referred to the necessary specialist care, compromising the right to 
treatment.  Unlike for other health conditions, the Department of Corrections has no 
systematic in-prison identification of neurological damage.252  Therefore, unless prison 
medical staff identify an obvious need or the prisoner self-reports, ABI will be undetected 
in the prison health system.  By contrast, when prisoners enter prison they are 
comprehensively screened for mental illness to ensure appropriate treatment.253  Given 
the difficulty identifying ABI’s many “silent symptoms”,254 it is unlikely ABI will be 
detected or treated without such a specialist screening tool being employed. 
 
The lack of in-prison ABI screening may violate the statutory right to treatment.  Access 
to healthcare is highly dependent on adequate identification and assessment of need.255  
Accordingly, a right to diagnosis may well constitute part of the right to treatment as its 
essential prerequisite.  This means the inadequate in-prison screening of ABI-related 
issues, as the necessary first step in ensuring those issues are treated, may breach the right 
to treatment. 
 
However, it could also be argued that the right to treatment in s 75 of the Corrections Act 
2004 is limited to identified health problems and, therefore, a failure to identify a 
complex health need such as ABI does not breach the state’s obligations.  In the author’s 
view, this is flawed for three reasons.  First, as noted, identification is central to 
treatment.  When a person attends their general practitioner they do so to receive a 
diagnosis as well as to receive treatment and so divorcing the two would create an 
artificial limit on the concept of treatment in the Corrections Act 2004.  Second, as noted, 
the right to treatment reflects international standards for the treatment of prisoners,256 
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affirmed in the Corrections Act 2004 itself.257  These international standards specify a 
prison medical officer should examine every prisoner upon admission “with a view 
particularly to the discovery of physical or mental illness”.258  This shows that the 
international standards the Corrections Act purports to implement envisage diagnosis or 
detection of health issues as part of prisoners’ right to treatment.  Third, the prison 
environment is not conducive to prisoners self-reporting health issues.  Prisoners are 
reluctant to display vulnerability or engage in help-seeking behaviour, a consequence of 
the aggressive culture of prison life,259 and to avoid placement in an at-risk unit, 
perceived as a punitive measure by prison inmates.260  As such, prisoners are unlikely to 
independently seek treatment for self-identified cognitive deficits, impulsivity, or other 
ABI symptoms.  This means, if prisoners’ health is to be maintained, and the right to 
treatment realised, identification of need must be an obligation on the state and not the 
individual prisoner. 
 
Even if a prisoner’s ABI needs are identified, the current regime also appears to breach 
the equivalence of care principle.  The National Health Committee identified the 
equivalence of care principle requires “all prisoners [to] be able to access the same level 
of healthcare and disability support services as the public outside prison who have the 
same level of need”.261  This is manifestly not the case for ABI prisoners.  The treatment 
services needed to rehabilitate ABI-related executive dysfunction are “highly specialised” 
and require a dedicated therapeutic environment.262  Despite this, there are no secure ABI 
rehabilitation facilities for prisoners with executive dysfunction to receive such 
treatment.263  As a consequence, serious offenders with ABI must remain in prison.  This 
is not best practice.  ABI rehabilitation has been identified as optimally provided in a 
specialist residential facility where the patient can be managed by specialist health 
practitioners, not custodial staff.264  Custodial staff are not health trained, operate under a 
different professional philosophy, and may not be sensitive to the needs of an ABI 
rehabilitation programme.265 
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In contrast to the treatment services available to prisoners, non-prisoners have need-based 
access to specialist ABI rehabilitation programmes funded through the Accident 
Compensation Corporation or the Ministry of Health.266  This includes residential care 
and individualised rehabilitation with neurorehabilitation, occupational therapy, 
physiotherapy, psychological treatment, pharmaceutical treatment, speech therapy or 
other forms of ABI-related treatment.267  As prisoners are not currently able to be placed 
in such specialist ABI rehabilitation programmes, even if they present with serious brain 
injury like Mr Blackwood, the equivalence of care principle is not satisfied.  The standard 
of care available to prisoners is significantly lower than the standard available to non-
prisoners. 
 
It could also be argued that a more nuanced assessment of the equivalence of care 
principle would emphasise it is limited by “reasonableness”.  Section 75(2) of the 
Corrections Act 2004 states “the standard of health care that is available to prisoners … 
must be reasonably equivalent to the standard of health care available to the public”.  
Accordingly, the fact a prisoner with ABI is not provided dedicated residential therapy 
when a non-prisoner is may not breach the equivalence principle alone.  Provided such a 
prisoner received access to adequate ABI rehabilitation in prison, the obligation may be 
satisfied. 
 
However, even on this more nuanced view, the equivalence principle appears violated by 
the status quo.  There are currently no in-prison ABI rehabilitation programmes,268 and 
ABI treatment providers are not known to be contracted into prisons to provide 
services.269  Accordingly, it appears that prisoners with ABI-related executive 
dysfunction currently receive no treatment or care services.  This violates prisoners’ right 
to treatment and the equivalence of care principle: the total absence of specialist 
treatment is not reasonably equivalent to the standard of care available to a member of the 
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public with the same health needs.  As such, secure therapeutic facilities for ABI 
rehabilitation need to be established to ensure the state meets its statutory obligations. 
 
The scope of the right to treatment and equivalence principle are untested in the New 
Zealand courts and so the exact standard required is unclear.  This is likely a result of the 
bar on personal injury litigation in the Accident Compensation regime.270  If the very high 
standard required for exemplary damages cannot be established, a prisoner is not entitled 
to directly claim for a breach of these provisions as the Accident Compensation regime 
automatically covers any physical harm suffered as a consequence.271 
B Ill treatment as a consequence of imprisonment 
 
Not only does imprisoning ABI offenders without providing rehabilitation violate the 
statutory right to treatment, it may also violate the NZBORA on the grounds of ill 
treatment. 
1 The right to be free from ill treatment 
 
The NZBORA prohibits ill treatment in ss 9 and 23(5).  Section 9 is a negative right: it 
absolutely prohibits state activity amounting to torture or cruel, degrading, or 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.272  Section 23(5) is a positive right: it 
requires the state to ensure all persons who it deprives of liberty are treated with 
“humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person”.273  The two rights 
were identified by the Supreme Court as forming a hierarchy.274  Section 9 covers more 
reprehensible conduct, to be “utterly condemned as outrageous and unacceptable in any 
circumstances”,275 while s 23(5) covers conduct “of a lesser order, not rising to a level 
deserving to be called outrageous” but which is still unacceptable.276 
 
Section 9 has a narrow scope.  It is reserved for “truly egregious cases which call for a 
level of denunciation of the same order as that appropriate for torture”.277  Establishing a 
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breach of the right requires a “high threshold to be met”.278  This has been strictly applied 
in recent case law with s 9 found not to have been breached despite manifestly improper 
treatment of persons detained in state custody.  Two examples illustrate this.  First, in 
Falwasser, a mentally ill criminal suspect was struck on the head with a baton and pepper 
sprayed for some 20 minutes through the vents of an enclosed police cell, causing him 
significant physical and psychological distress.279  This conduct was found not to reach 
the level required for a violation of s 9,280 despite it being deliberate, excessive,281 and 
causing ongoing harm in the form of post traumatic stress disorder.282  Second, in 
Taunoa, the right was found not violated by prison staff implementing a “behaviour 
modification regime” that involved keeping prisoners in solitary confinement for up to 23 
hours per day with minimal access to physical exercise or natural light, in the worst case 
lasting for nearly three years.283  Thus, it will take an extraordinary and rare case to 
establish a violation of s 9 under current New Zealand law. 
 
Section 23(5) has a much wider scope and contains a lower threshold to establish a 
breach.  Section 23(5) has been identified as covering conduct that “lacks humanity, but 
falls short of cruelty”, that is “demeaning but not degrading”, and that is “clearly 
excessive in the circumstances but not grossly so”.284  The demeaning and excessive 
treatment of the detained persons in both Falwasser and Taunoa violated s 23(5). 
 
In addition to demeaning or excessive treatment, s 23(5) can also be violated by the state 
failing to adhere to minimum requirements for the treatment of prisoners as contained in 
domestic legislation (principally the Corrections Act 2004) or in the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (“UN Standards”), collectively 
referred to as “the standards” herein.285  A breach of the standards will not automatically 
violate s 23(5),286 but as they provide an indication of what is acceptable and 
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unacceptable treatment of prisoners,287 non-compliance “bears very heavily indeed on 
assessment of breach”.288 
2 Does imprisoning an offender with ABI amount to ill treatment? 
 
Imprisoning an offender with ABI without provision for their needs may violate the right 
to be free from ill treatment on two grounds.  First, the heightened vulnerability of people 
with ABI may render their imprisonment unduly harsh, violating ss 9 or 23(5).  Second, 
as prisoners do not receive ABI treatment while in prison there is an arguable breach of 
the standards, violating s 23(5).  These arguments are explored below. 
 
(a) Unduly harsh experience of prison 
 
The prison environment may be more severe for a person with ABI than for a non-
impaired person, potentially rendering their imprisonment within the realm of ill 
treatment.  This is illustrated by three characteristics of ABI prisoners: vulnerability; 
heightened propensity to be placed in an at-risk unit; and heightened propensity to be 
subject to prison discipline.  First, prisoners with ABI are often vulnerable to being 
victimised by other prisoners through physical or sexual assault, intimidation or 
bullying.289  Such vulnerability is often a result of the adverse effects of executive 
dysfunction on gauging socially appropriate behaviour and managing aggression or 
impulsivity.290 
 
This was manifest in Blackwood v R.  Expert evidence identified Mr Blackwood’s 
executive dysfunction would make him vulnerable to exploitation and place him at risk 
from other inmates.291  In its decision, the Court of Appeal identified that as he had 
already been in a number of prison fights, “the fears as to how Mr Blackwood might fare 
in the custodial setting have been realised”.292  Consequently, he was placed in an at-risk 
unit to ensure his safety.293  Such a demonstrably increased likelihood of experiencing 
violence and intimidation may render imprisonment a harsher experience for ABI 
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prisoners than other prisoners.  This may mean it is excessive or disproportionate, 
breaching ss 9 and 23(5) of the NZBORA. 
 
Supporting this analysis, in a pre-ID(CCR)Act decision, R v P, the High Court held that 
sentencing a moderately intellectually disabled sexual offender to imprisonment would 
constitute cruel or disproportionately severe punishment, breaching s 9 NZBORA.294  
Williams J considered expert evidence that identified the offender was “plainly 
vulnerable” due to his mental impairment and “might be subject to sexual attacks if 
imprisoned”, rendering him likely to become “fearful and suicidal”.295  This risk meant 
his imprisonment would be “inappropriate, disproportionate and unsuitable”.296  
Accordingly, the offender, who, if unimpaired, would have received a significant term of 
imprisonment, received a community sentence.297 
 
Given the extremely high threshold set in more recent case law on s 9 NZBORA, it is 
unclear whether the R v P fact pattern would still violate the right.  Despite this, the case 
provides a useful example of how a mentally impaired person’s heightened vulnerability 
may render their (otherwise justified) imprisonment excessive or disproportionate.  
Further, as excessive treatment is also grounds for a violation of s 23(5) NZBORA,298 this 
may support a claim that incarcerating a mentally impaired person identified as at high 
risk of victimisation (such as Mr Blackwood) may constitute ill treatment under that 
wider right. 
 
A second and related characteristic of ABI offenders that may render imprisonment 
unduly harsh is the likelihood of placement in an at-risk unit.  This may result from 
increased victimisation, as occurred with Mr Blackwood.  It can also result from a 
prisoner with ABI being aggressive or victimising others,299 resulting in placement in the 
unit to minimise the risk to others.300  Alternatively, it may result from the propensity of 
ABI prisoners to become suicidal or attempt to self harm.  Research in Australia 
identified inmates with TBI exhibit much higher rates of self harm than inmates without 
TBI.301  In addition, inmates with TBI are three to four times more likely to suicide.302  
  
294  R v P (1993) 10 CRNZ 250 (HC) (unpaginated). 
295  Ibid. 
296  Ibid. 
297  Ibid. 
298  Reekie v Attorney General, above n 278, at [93]. 
299  Interview with McWaine, above n 201. 
300  National Health Committee, above n 3, at 35. 
301  Brown and Kelly, above n 236, at [6.5]. 
48 Acquired Brain Injury and Serious Criminal Offenders: An Argument to Expand the Court’s Therapeutic Jurisdiction 
Consequently, prisoners with ABI are much more likely to be placed in at-risk units than 
non-ABI prisoners. 
 
Placement in at-risk units has been identified as punitive and risks exacerbating the 
harshness of the prison environment for a person with ABI.303  At-risk units are prison 
wings where prisoners are kept in isolation and continuously observed by prison staff.304  
The isolation cells are small and bare, lack fresh air, and result in very limited social 
contact for the prisoner.305  Consequently, placement in these units is seen by inmates as a 
form of punishment.306  In addition, for prisoners with cognitive disability (including 
ABI) the units can cause deterioration in physical and mental health, largely a result of 
the adverse effects of segregation and isolation on brain function.307  As such, the use of 
at-risk units to mitigate an ABI prisoner’s susceptibility to maltreatment, or to manage 
aggressive or self-harming behaviour, may exacerbate the potential for incarceration to be 
excessive or disproportionate and therefore breach ss 9 or 23(5) NZBORA. 
 
The third characteristic of an ABI prisoner that may render imprisonment unduly harsh is 
their reduced ability to understand and follow prison rules.308  As discussed in Part III, 
ABI-related executive dysfunction can impede a person’s ability to process information, 
remember rules, and use memory to foresee the consequences of behaviour.309  Therefore, 
ABI inmates are more likely to commit in-prison offences, be subject to disciplinary 
hearings, and receive in-prison punishments such as loss of privileges, isolation, or 
extended sentences.310  The increased likelihood of ABI prisoners to commit in-prison 
offences and receive additional punishments as a result of their disability also supports an 
argument that imprisoning such persons may be excessive and violate the right to be free 
from ill treatment. 
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(b) Breach of the standards 
 
The second substantive ground of argument establishing ill treatment is the breach of 
standards.  As discussed earlier, a breach of the standards may justify a finding of ill 
treatment depending on its nature and consequences.311  Three breaches of the standards 
could be argued here.  First, as explored in subpart A above, a breach of the right to 
treatment in s 75 of the Corrections Act 2004.  A second and related breach is of Article 
62 of the UN Standards which requires prison medical services to detect and treat “any 
physical or mental illnesses or defects which may hamper a prisoner’s rehabilitation”.312  
As ABI is clearly an impairment which may impede the potential for rehabilitation, the 
inadequate detection or treatment of it in the current prison system may breach Article 62.  
Third, Article 82(2) of the UN Standards requires prisoners who suffer from “mental 
abnormalities” to be observed and treated in specialised institutions.313  Prisoners with 
ABI are currently detained in the general prison environment and not placed in specialist 
units or transferred into dedicated therapeutic facilities.314  Such failure to make any 
special provision for an identifiably high needs category of prisoner appears inconsistent 
with Article 82(2). 
 
As such, it is arguable the current imprisonment of ABI offenders breaches a number of 
the standards.  This supports the argument that such imprisonment is a prima facie breach 
of s 23(5) NZBORA.  When coupled with the disproportionately harsh experience of 
imprisonment on an ABI inmate, the current practice of imprisoning ABI offenders may 
violate their human rights.  Accordingly, there is a need to expand the court’s therapeutic 
jurisdiction to divert ABI offenders from prison and into treatment.  Without such 
provision, the continued incarceration of ABI offenders could be challenged and the state 
found liable for breaching its human rights obligations. 
C An analogy with intellectual disability 
 
The argument to expand the therapeutic regime is supported by the ID(CCR)Act’s 
history, which evidences a striking similarity between the previous position of 
intellectually disabled offenders and the current position of ABI offenders.  Accordingly, 
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just as the then untenable position of intellectually disabled offenders justified an 
expansion of the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction to divert such people into care, the 
analogous position of ABI offenders in the contemporary regime justifies a similar 
expansion. 
1 A brief history of the ID(CCR)Act 
 
The ID(CCR)Act was enacted to remedy an injustice created by excluding intellectually 
disabled offenders from the court’s therapeutic jurisdiction under the MH(CAT)Act.315  
Prior to the enactment of the MH(CAT)Act, intellectually disabled persons were captured 
by the definition of mental disorder in the Mental Health Act 1969 which allowed 
intellectually disabled persons to be detained under compulsory treatment orders and also 
gave the court jurisdiction to grant therapeutic dispositions for intellectually disabled 
offenders via the Criminal Justice Act 1985.316  While this ensured intellectually disabled 
offenders were not inappropriately imprisoned, it meant they were treated as if mentally 
ill and detained in psychiatric facilities.317  As medical knowledge of intellectually 
disability developed, this was perceived as inappropriate: intellectually disabled persons 
had an identifiably different type of impairment and very different health needs than the 
mentally ill.318  Consequently, when the MH(CAT)Act was enacted to replace the Mental 
Health Act 1969, the legislative drafters deliberately excluded intellectual disability from 
the definition of mental disorder to prevent the exercise of its powers in respect of the 
intellectually disabled.319 
 
An unforeseen consequence of the exclusion of intellectual disability from the 
MH(CAT)Act was the loss of the court’s jurisdiction to order therapeutic dispositions for 
intellectually disabled offenders at sentencing.320  This created a “legislative gap” which 
resulted in intellectually disabled offenders being inappropriately imprisoned (and 
therefore at risk of maltreatment)321 or released into the community without their 
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offending behaviour being addressed or the risk they posed to others managed.322  
Accordingly, the exclusion of intellectually disabled offenders from therapeutic 
dispositions was rightly perceived as creating an injustice, leaving such persons not 
“adequately protected in criminal justice proceedings”.323 
 
Concern over this legislative gap led to the development of the ID(CCR)Act which 
established a sui generis regime for intellectually disabled offenders.  This ensures such 
persons receive specialised care in dedicated facilities rather than being inappropriately 
detained in prison or psychiatric institutions.324  The ID(CCR)Act regime is identified as 
reflecting “well-established international thinking” about the care needs of intellectually 
disabled offenders,325 and as resulting in “many beneficial clinical outcomes” through 
providing offenders access to specialised rehabilitation programmes that reduce 
recidivism and address the previously unmet social and health needs of this group.326 
2 A similar path: what the ID(CCR)Act’s history shows about ABI offenders 
 
There are some interesting similarities between the pre-ID(CCR)Act position of 
intellectually disabled offenders and the current position of ABI offenders.  First, as 
occurred with intellectually disabled offenders, the exclusion of ABI offenders from 
therapeutic dispositions creates a “legislative gap” meaning such persons are imprisoned 
despite their vulnerability to harm and lesser ability to understand or be reformed by the 
experience of punishment.327  Such inappropriate imprisonment of intellectually disabled 
offenders was identified as an injustice requiring reform.328  Surely this is apposite to the 
current imprisonment of ABI offenders who today stand in the same position as the 
intellectually disabled did pre-ID(CCR)Act.  Second, just as the healthcare needs of the 
intellectually disabled are different to those of the mentally ill, the needs of persons with 
ABI also differ to these two categories.329  Detaining intellectually disabled persons in 
mental health facilities was identified as inappropriate given their different conditions, 
  
322  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 1999 (329-1) (explanatory note) at ii; Webb, Duff and 
Reed, above n 98, at 206. 
323  Visser, above n 82, at 193. 
324  Webb, Duff and Reed, above n 98, at 210. 
325  Bell and Brookbanks, above n 132, at 66. 
326  Webb, Duff and Reed, above n 98, at 210. 
327  See Blackwood v R, above n 133. 
328  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 1999 (329-1) (explanatory note) at ii. 
329  Interview with Hansen, above n 2; Interview with Foster, above n 2. 
52 Acquired Brain Injury and Serious Criminal Offenders: An Argument to Expand the Court’s Therapeutic Jurisdiction 
and therefore a sui generis regime was necessary.330  As people with ABI also have a 
different form of mental impairment than the mentally ill and the intellectually disabled 
and require different care and treatment,331 the justification for a need-specific therapeutic 
regime surely extends to them. 
 
Given these similarities, and the positive outcomes that have resulted from the 
ID(CCR)Act regime, the current position of ABI offenders seems unprincipled.  The 
ID(CCR)Act’s legislative history suggests that where a cohort of criminal offenders 
labour under an identifiable mental impairment that would benefit from treatment or 
rehabilitation, and which renders their imprisonment unjust and detention in other 
therapeutic facilities inappropriate, consideration should be given to a unique therapeutic 
regime.  This applies to ABI offenders.  Without the development of therapeutic facilities 
to cater for their need, ABI offenders, like the intellectually disabled before them, will not 
be “adequately protected in criminal justice proceedings”.332  Excluded from the 
therapeutic jurisdiction, they will continue to endure maltreatment in prison and be 
released back into the community without the risk posed by their mental impairment 
being addressed. 
 
VIII Addressing the Inequity: How to Better Provide for ABI Offenders 
 
This paper has argued the current exclusion of ABI offenders from the court’s therapeutic 
jurisdiction is unjustifiable as it places the state in breach of its statutory duties and is 
unprincipled.  Accordingly, better provision needs to be made for ABI offenders.  This 
section explores two options for doing so. 
A In-prison rehabilitation programmes 
 
First, in-prison rehabilitation programmes could be established to ensure appropriate 
healthcare services are provided to prisoners with ABI.  A comparative model is found in 
Victoria (Australia) where two in-prison programmes provide treatment and support for 
violent or sexual ABI offenders ineligible for therapeutic diversions.333  Through the 
  
330  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 1999 (329-1) (explanatory note) at ii. 
331  See Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 25, at 40-41; Interview with Hansen, 
above n 2. 
332  Visser, above n 82, at 193. 
333  In Victoria, therapeutic dispositions (known as hospital security orders) are only available to 
offenders with mental illness: Department of Health, State Government of Victoria, Australia 
“Sentencing and Mental Health Acts (Amendment) Act 2005: Summary of Key Amendments” 
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“Corrections Victoria ABI Program”, specialist clinical consultants work with prisons to 
identify, assess, and manage ABI prisoners.334  Once ABI is identified, an individual 
treatment plan is developed and “early and direct specialist interventions” provided to 
address ABI-related adverse behaviour.335  The programme has been identified as 
improving outcomes for ABI offenders.336 
 
A second programme is the “Disability Prison Pathways Program” which caters for all 
forms of cognitive impairment, including ABI.337  In this programme, cognitively 
impaired inmates are placed in specialist units away from the general prison population.  
ABI offenders are placed in a specific unit in Port Phillip Prison, to which they are 
referred on sentencing, or presumably transferred if their ABI is identified after 
admission to prison.338  The unit employs a therapeutic approach.339  Prisoners are needs-
assessed and placed on individualised programmes to address their particular cognitive 
deficits, and any violence, sexual, or substance abuse issues.340  “Positive improvements” 
have been recorded since the programme’s implementation, particularly in reduced 
recidivism.341 
 
Given these benefits, the introduction of similar programmes in New Zealand should be 
considered.  This would address some of the legal problems of our current system, as in-
prison identification, and the creation of a specialist unit to provide ABI rehabilitation to 
consenting inmates, would better realise prisoners’ right to treatment. 
 
However, practitioners interviewed for this research expressed mixed views on the 
propriety of in-prison treatment.  Two practitioners considered in-prison ABI 
rehabilitation should be a last resort, given the harshness of the prison environment and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2006) <www.health.vic.gov.au>.  Other mentally impaired offenders, including those with ABI, are 
eligible for therapeutic diversion through problem solving courts.  However, serious violent or 
sexual offenders are ineligible for such programmes, so it is not an appropriate model for the 
category of offenders addressed here: Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, above n 25, at 
250 and 252. 
334  Brown and Kelly, above n 236, at [6.8.2]. 
335  Ibid. 
336  Ibid. 
337  Ibid, at [6.8.4]. 
338  Ibid, at [6.8.7]. 
339  Ibid. 
340  Ibid. 
341  Ibid. 
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the lack of health training of custodial staff.342  Only if staff were properly trained, the 
programme properly resourced, and the unit segregated, would this option be 
acceptable.343  However, another practitioner noted that where an ABI offender is violent 
or poses a risk of harm to others (as is often the case for the category of offenders 
addressed in this paper) in-prison treatment programmes may be necessary.344  Prison 
staff have particular expertise in managing violent and other dangerous behaviours and so 
only once risk is reduced to an acceptable level should an impaired offender be 
transferred out of the corrections jurisdiction and into an alternative facility.345 
B Secure ABI rehabilitation facilities outside prison 
 
A second reform option is to establish a dedicated ABI rehabilitation facility outside 
prison.  Such a facility would need to cater for the security, as well as therapeutic, needs 
of ABI offenders to address the legitimate public safety concerns identified above.  
However, the forensic mental health units and intellectual disability care facilities that 
currently operate accept serious violent and sexual offenders and so are appropriate 
models to base an ABI rehabilitation centre upon.  These facilities operate under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and are therapeutic in focus, but have security 
measures to restrict patients’ movements and ensure custodial requirements are also 
met.346 
 
The establishment of a secure ABI rehabilitation facility outside prison would also reflect 
best practice healthcare for offenders and so is preferred to in-prison therapy.  This is 
largely due to differences in institutional design and competence.  Prisons are not 
therapeutic in design or practice.  Prison buildings are often basic and lack the equipment 
and facilities available in purpose-built therapeutic settings.347  The prison environment 
and routine is designed for custody, not therapy.348  Adequate monitoring of inmates’ 
health and condition may not be possible with prison lock-down periods,349 and ABI-
specific care, such as fatigue management, may not be conducive to rigid prison 
  
342  Interview with Hansen, above n 2; Interview with Foster, above n 2. 
343  Ibid. 
344  Interview with McWaine, above n 201. 
345  Ibid. 
346  Sandy Simpson “New Zealand Provision of Forensic Mental Health Services” (2008) Rethinking 
Crime and Punishment (2008) <www.rethinking.org.nz>. 
347  Brinded and Evans, above n 131, at 423, 431 and 436. 
348  National Health Committee, above n 3, at 41. 
349  Brinded and Evans, above n 131, at 431. 
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timetables.350  Prison staff are also mostly custodial.  They are not trained in healthcare 
and may lack the necessary knowledge and philosophical orientation to provide high 
level therapeutic care.351  As noted by Brinded and Evans, “prison officers deal with 
prisoners” whereas health professionals “maintain interactions with patients”.352  Finally, 
there is a recognised tension between the institutional goals of the corrections’ system 
and those of the health system.353  This conflict justified the transfer of responsibility for 
mentally ill offenders to the health jurisdiction,354 and seems apposite to ABI offenders.  
Therapeutic services are best provided by the health sector and ABI rehabilitation is a 
therapeutic service. 
 
Accordingly, ABI rehabilitation for offenders should be provided in specialist facilities 
run under the Ministry of Health’s jurisdiction and not as in-prison programmes.  If this 
was accepted and ABI rehabilitation provided outside prison, a legal mechanism would 
be needed to transfer the offender out of the corrections jurisdiction and into the health 
jurisdiction.  Two options for this are explored below. 
1 Expanding the mental disorder definition under the MH(CAT)Act 
 
An obvious mechanism to transfer an ABI offender into the new therapeutic facility is the 
current MH(CAT)Act regime.  As discussed above, where “mentally disordered” and in 
need of compulsory treatment, an offender can be diverted from prison and into the 
MH(CAT)Act regime.355  This was identified as only appropriate for offenders for whom 
“treatment” is available in the relevant certified hospitals or its risks being unlawful.  
Accordingly, an additional requirement of “treatability” was proposed as part of the 
“mental disorder” definition.  However, if ABI rehabilitation facilities were established 
and certified,356 proper treatment of the mental disorder would be available under the 
MH(CAT)Act, and the current restriction on the definition applying to ABI offenders 
would fall away.  Thus, provided the offender met the other requirements of the 
definition, the MH(CAT)Act could be a conduit to the new therapeutic facility. 
  
350  Interview with Foster, above n 2. 
351  National Health Committee, above n 3, at 41. 
352  Brinded and Evans, above n 131, at 436. 
353  National Health Committee, above n 3, at 41; Brinded and Evans, above n 131, at 436. 
354  Brinded and Evans, above n 131, at 424. 
355  Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, ss 34(2) and (3). 
356  The facility would need to be certified as a relevant “hospital” by the Director-General of Health:  
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2(1) and Health and Disability 
Services (Safety) Act 2001, s 9. 
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Using the existing “mental disorder” definition as a gateway to the expanded therapeutic 
regime offers several advantages.  First, the definition is broad.  This reduces the risk of 
an overly-prescriptive definition creating arbitrariness as to who is included, and 
excluded, from the therapeutic jurisdiction.  This was seen in R v Satherley where the 
ID(CCR)Act’s prescriptive definition excluded an otherwise eligible offender, potentially 
creating injustice.357  With a broad definition, each offender’s case can be considered on 
its merits, with the relevant health assessors identifying whether or not that offender 
requires treatment.  Second, no legislative change would be required.  Once the Director-
General had certified the secure ABI rehabilitation facility a “hospital” for the purposes 
of the MH(CAT)Act, the statutory regime would automatically encompass it.  This would 
be time and resource efficient.  In addition, the MH(CAT)Act provides a comprehensive 
supervisory regime to protect those subject to it, and ABI offenders would benefit from 
this. 
2 Enactment of an ABI specific statute 
 
Alternatively, a sui generis statute could be enacted.  This would have some advantages 
over incorporating ABI into the MH(CAT)Act regime.  First, and conversely to the 
above, a specific threshold definition could be introduced.  Some offenders may seek to 
use their ABI to avoid taking responsibility for their offending,358 which would be easier 
under a broad definition like “mental disorder”.  An ABI-specific definition could more 
tightly prescribe the severity of executive dysfunction needed to warrant a therapeutic 
disposition and so ensure all offenders diverted into the therapeutic regime would 
genuinely benefit from it. 
 
Second, a separate legislative regime would have greater conceptual clarity.  Just as 
intellectual disability and mental illness are recognised as different forms of mental 
impairment that should not be managed under one framework,359 ABI may deserve a 
unique rubric.  ABI has different symptoms and therapeutic needs to the mental illnesses 
typically captured within the MH(CAT)Act regime.360  Grouping multiple categories of 
mental impairment under one statute may fail to accommodate the particular needs and 
  
357  R v Satherley, above n 77. 
358  Interview with McWaine, above n 201. 
359  Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care) Bill 1999 (329-1) (explanatory note) at ii. 
360  Interview with Hansen, above n 2; Interview with Foster, above n 2. 
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issues of each category,361 and so may not be best practice.  Accordingly, while this paper 
lacks the scope to consider what an ABI-specific statute should contain, there is some 
logic in developing separate legislation. 
 
In summary, there are advantages in both legislative mechanisms.  However, on the basis 
that careful drafting could avoid an over-prescriptive definition and avoid the rigidity of 
the ID(CCR)Act’s gateway definition, a sui generis statute is preferable.  It seems logical 
to have different legislative regimes for broadly different forms of mental impairment, as 
the ID(CCR)Act is itself precedent for. 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
This paper analysed the legislative framework for diverting mentally impaired offenders 
from prison and into therapeutic services.  It demonstrated how this framework currently 
excludes ABI offenders as a result of the gateway definitions of “intellectual disability” 
and “mental disorder”.  This exclusion is untenable as it means serious offenders with 
ABI are imprisoned where their health condition is untreated and they are at risk of 
maltreatment.  Accordingly, the status quo may violate human rights law and domestic 
legislation prescribing minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. 
 
To remedy this, the paper recommended secure ABI rehabilitation facilities be 
established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and an ABI-specific statute be 
enacted to facilitate diversion into this new regime.  An expanded therapeutic regime 
would better realise the state’s obligations and would also better protect the public.  The 
current legislative framework fails to address the underlying causes of offending 
behaviour in persons with ABI and so does little to reduce recidivism.  Rather than 
continue to cycle ABI offenders through the criminal justice system, the law needs to 
reflect developing medical knowledge of criminality in persons with ABI and work to 
facilitate their rehabilitation. 
  
361  Interview with McWaine, above n 201. 
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XI Appendix One:  Interview Questions 
 
1. What is your background / experience in identifying or treating mentally impaired 
persons who have committed criminal offences? 
 
2. Do you think that there is a connection between traumatic brain injury and criminal 
offending? 
a. If yes:  can you explain what you think the connection is? 
 
3. How do you see traumatic brain injury best characterised:  an “intellectual disability”; 
a “mental disorder”; a “mental impairment”; or something different? 
a. If “mental disorder”:  are you familiar with the definition of “mental disorder” 
in the MH(CAT)Act? 
b. If yes:  can you explain how you see traumatic brain injury fulfilling its 
requirements? 
 
4. Do you have any experience in working with people with traumatic brain injury who 
have committed criminal offences and, if so, in what context? 
a. If yes:  what is the usual outcome for such persons? 
b. Do you see that as a similar or different outcome to offenders with a mental 
illness such as schizophrenia? 
 
5. What is the potential for rehabilitation or treatment of brain injury?  Could this be 
carried out in prison or does it necessitate removal to a treatment facility or hospital? 
 
6. Is it appropriate to detain offenders with brain injury in the same facility as offenders 
with psychiatric illness (eg, in forensic mental health units)?  
 
7. Are you familiar with the legislative framework for identifying and managing 
offenders with mental impairment (the MH(CAT)Act, ID(CCR)Act, and 
CP(MIP)Act)? 
a. If yes:  do you encounter any problems in applying this framework in the 
course of your work? 
b. If yes:  do you see any scope for improvement? 
 
8. Do you have any experience or knowledge of alternative regimes (such as those in 
other countries? 
 
XII Appendix Two:  Offenders with Mental Impairment – Legislative Pathways to Treatment or Punishment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criminal offence committed 
Non-imprisonable? 
No diversionary process available.  
Offending can be used to initiate civil 
commitment under MH(CAT)Act 1992 (see 
Ministry of Health v M FC Manukau, FAM-
2006-092-2802, 21 December 2006). 
Imprisonable? 
Diversionary jurisdiction exists 
(CP(MIP)Act 2003, s 5(1)) 
Defendant must be “mentally impaired” 
Mental impairment = 
incapable of knowing the act 
was wrong = insane (s 23 
Crimes Act 1961) 
No trial or conviction.  Therapeutic 
dispositions under ss 24 or 25 CP(MIP)Act 
2003. 
Mental impairment = unable to 
plead, understand proceedings, 
conduct defence or instruct 
counsel = unfit to stand trial (s 
4(1) CP(MIP)Act 2003) 
Mental impairment = “mental 
disorder” under s 2(1) 
MH(CAT)Act  1992 and 
treatment required for offender’s 
interest or public safety 
Mental impairment = 
“intellectual disability” under s 7 
ID(CCR)Act 2003 and care 
required for offender’s interest or 
public safety 
Conviction and therapeutic 
disposition under ss 34(1)(a)(i) 
or 34(1)(b)(i) CP(MIP)Act 
2003 = treatment in “hospital” 
under MH(CAT)Act 1992 
Conviction and therapeutic 
disposition under ss 34(1)(a)(ii) 
or 34(1)(b)(ii) CP(MIP)Act 
2003 = care in “facility” under 
ID(CCR)Act 2003 
Mental impairment = outside 
jurisdiction of s 34 CP(MIP)Act = 
conviction and sentence as per 
Sentencing Act 2002 (mitigating 
factors may apply) 
Imprisonment (if serious) 
Treatment in prison (s 75 
Corrections Act 2004) 
Transfer for treatment (ss 
45 or 46 MH(CAT)Act 
1992) or care (s 45 
ID(CCR)Act 2003) 
